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ABSTRACT 
  In deciding Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education 
and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, the Supreme Court of the United States will likely 
confront a critical issue to emerge from the lower court opinions on 
voluntary integration plans: whether school districts that use race as a 
factor in student assignment must comply with a legal requirement of 
individualized consideration. The Court has imposed such a 
requirement in other contexts, but it has not clearly explained what the 
concept of individualized consideration means and why particular 
forms of it matter. 
  This Article clarifies the meaning and function of individualized 
consideration as both a concept and a legal requirement. After 
defining the concept apart from any legal requirements, the Article 
surveys the Court’s cases—from affirmative action in higher 
education, to race-conscious redistricting, to affirmative action in 
government contracting—in order to identify the principal concern to 
which different requirements of individualized consideration respond. 
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  This survey reveals the key determinant of the type of 
individualized consideration that the Court requires in a given 
context: its judgment about how the use of racial criteria will likely 
impact racial balkanization in America over the long run. 
Accordingly, this Article assesses the constitutionality of the two plans 
before the Court in light of this concern. The question is how the use 
of race in student assignment affects balkanization. 
  After identifying three compelling interests that support race-
conscious assignment plans, this Article recommends an 
individualized consideration requirement that is modest in its 
demands. This is because voluntary integration plans likely reduce 
balkanization when school boards make only limited use of racial 
classifications in granting or denying student requests for certain 
schools and do not impose significant burdens on individuals and 
families.  
  Finally, this Article applies the standard it proposes to the plans 
before the Court. It concludes that the Seattle, Washington plan is 
more suspect than the Jefferson County, Kentucky plan, but that both 
likely meet the individualized consideration requirement that the 
Court’s cases suggest is most appropriate in this setting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two cases before the Supreme Court of the United States during 
its October 2006 Term may result in landmark rulings.1 They concern 
the extent to which school boards may use racial criteria—whether 
explicit racial classifications or implicit race consciousness—in 
assigning students to schools on a nonmerit basis in order to advance 
integration. The Court’s decisions “could affect hundreds of school 
systems in all areas of the country.”2 Its rulings could also determine 
the final legacy of Brown v. Board of Education3 in American society. 
The stakes are enormous. 
The interests potentially supporting race consciousness in 
student assignment include (1) securing the civic, social, and 
educational benefits thought to be associated with racially integrated 
schools, (2) reducing minority student isolation in educationally 
inferior schools, and, I will suggest, (3) expressively affirming the 
value of integrated schools as an American moral ideal. The 
threshold question before the Court is whether any of these interests 
is compelling.  
If the Court answers affirmatively, another key question is 
whether school districts that use racial criteria in student assignment 
violate a “right to individualized consideration without regard 
to . . . race.”4 The latter issue will not prove decisive if the Court 
concludes that none of the proffered interests is compelling. But if the 
Court holds otherwise—and I argue that there is a strong basis for so 
holding—then the Court will likely confront whether to apply a so-
called “individualized consideration” requirement as part of the 
narrow tailoring inquiry. This issue is “perhaps the most important 
one to emerge from the lower court opinions on voluntary integration 
plans,”5 and it has generated great confusion. Even courts that agree 
 
 1. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); McFarland v. Jefferson 
County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. 
granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 
05-915). 
 2. Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Race as Factor in School Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 
2006, at A1. 
 3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 4. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 n.52 (1978). 
 5. James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
327, 341 (2006). 
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on the constitutionality of race-conscious assignments disagree about 
whether school districts must afford individualized consideration.6 
The district court in Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of 
Education, the case involving Jefferson County, Kentucky, 
determined that it had to decide whether the assignment plan 
“incorporates some sufficient form of individualized attention.” The 
court “conclude[d] that it does” because the “assignment process 
focuses a great deal of attention upon the individual characteristics of 
a student’s application, such as place of residence and student choice 
of school or program.”7 The Sixth Circuit approved this reasoning.8 
By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the case involving Seattle, 
Washington, concluded that “if a noncompetitive, voluntary student 
assignment plan is otherwise narrowly tailored, a district need not 
consider each student in an individualized, holistic manner.”9 The 
court so held because “the dangers that are present in the university 
context—of substituting racial preference for qualification-based 
competition—are absent here.”10 The dissent argued that race-
conscious assignment plans must afford individualized consideration 
of merit and other contributions to general diversity because “equal 
protection requires the District to focus upon the individual’s whole 
make up, rather than just a group’s skin color; this protects each 
student’s right to equal protection under the law.”11 
This dissensus is unsurprising. The Supreme Court has imposed a 
legal requirement of individualized consideration in several decisions, 
but it has not clearly explained what the concept of individualized 
consideration means and why particular forms of it matter. In this 
Article, I clarify the meaning and function of individualized 
consideration as both a concept and a legal requirement. I first define 
the concept apart from any legal requirements. I then survey the 
 
 6. Throughout this Article, I use the terms “voluntary integration plans” and “race-
conscious student assignment plans” interchangeably. 
 7. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 858–59 (W.D. Ky. 2004). 
 8. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d 513, 514 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 9. 426 F.3d 1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 
2006) (No. 05-908). 
 10. Id. at 1181. 
 11. Id. at 1212 (Bea, J., dissenting). The First Circuit agrees with the Ninth. See Comfort v. 
Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). No other 
circuit has weighed in since Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003). 
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Court’s cases in order to identify the principal concern to which 
different legal requirements of individualized consideration respond. 
Finally, I assess the constitutionality of the voluntary integration 
plans before the Court in light of this concern. 
In Part I, I explain what it means conceptually for government to 
afford individualized consideration. It is critical to begin with a 
definition because it is easy to confuse the concept itself with 
particular legal requirements in particular settings, and because jurists 
and commentators sometimes press a false distinction between 
individualized consideration and consideration of group 
characteristics. 
In Part II, I turn from the concept of individualized consideration 
to the legal requirements articulated by the Court. I examine various 
contexts in which government uses racial criteria for the benefit of 
racial and ethnic minorities, and I identify the rationales animating 
the Court’s imposition of particular kinds of individualized 
consideration requirements in these settings. The presence or absence 
of one variant of individualized consideration, a variant rooted in a 
partial appreciation of the virtues of color consciousness, caused 
Justice Powell to endorse only certain affirmative action admissions 
programs in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12 The 
Court’s insistence on compliance with this same type of individualized 
consideration requirement distinguished its approval of affirmative 
action admissions in Grutter v. Bollinger13 from its rejection of them in 
Gratz v. Bollinger.14 I revisit Powell’s opinion in Bakke, drawing upon 
Paul Mishkin’s pathmarking analysis of Powell’s account of 
individualized consideration.15 I then analyze the role of 
individualized consideration in Grutter and Gratz, noting the close 
 
 12. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 14. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 15. Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the 
Constitutionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1983). Mishkin anticipated the 
view that sometimes “appearances do matter” in constitutional law. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
647 (1993). See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1236 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Action Be Defended?, 59 
OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 693 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and 
Affirmative Action After the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1601 (2002); 
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts” and Voting 
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 
506–07 (1993); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 74–76 (2003). 
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correspondence between Robert Post’s reading of these decisions in 
his Foreword to the Harvard Law Review16 and Mishkin’s 
interpretation of Bakke two decades earlier. 
Despite suggestions to the contrary,17 I show that a requirement 
of individualized consideration does not disable government from 
treating people in part as members of racial groups in every context in 
which government would like to use racial criteria. Government 
lawfully treats individuals in part as members of racial groups in the 
context of affirmative action in higher education and elsewhere, 
including race-conscious redistricting. No notion of individualized 
consideration is thought to be implicated in reapportionment, even 
when government constitutionally uses racial criteria, on the ground 
that redistricting is a process in which government sorts groups of 
people, not individuals. I suggest that this understanding is incorrect. 
Government affords individualized consideration in the context of 
reapportionment by determining whether individuals meet the 
selection criteria for inclusion in a given district based on their 
relevant characteristics. As for the legal requirements, the de facto 
prohibition on using race as “the predominant factor”18 functions as 
an individualized consideration requirement because it polices the 
extent to which government may deem racial criteria to be relevant 
criteria. 
I next demonstrate that in another area of equal protection 
jurisprudence—affirmative action in government contracting—the 
Court has imposed a different sort of individualized consideration 
requirement, one sounding in a constitutional commitment to 
colorblindness.19 Thus, although courts sometimes seem to assume 
that individualized consideration carries one specific set of legal 
requirements, the requirements set forth in the Court’s cases are in 
 
 16. Post, supra note 15, at 68–76. 
 17. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, 
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (asserting that the 
district “fails to treat individual students as individuals, which is a fatal flaw under the Court’s 
cases”). 
 18. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (“The plaintiff’s burden is to show . . . that 
race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision.”). 
 19. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (“[A]ny person, of 
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution 
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest 
judicial scrutiny.”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (“The 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those 
burdened or benefited by a particular classification.”). 
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fact context-sensitive. At times, individualized consideration permits 
a good measure of color-conscious state action when government 
distinguishes among people based on relevant criteria, but only if 
government creates the appearance of a good measure of 
colorblindness. At other times, individualized consideration requires 
government to act in a colorblind fashion. 
My scrutiny of the case law suggests that the type of 
individualized consideration required in a given context turns on the 
Court’s judgment about how the use of racial criteria is likely to 
impact racial balkanization in America over the long run. 
“Balkanization” references the extent to which Americans identify as 
members of separate racial or ethnic groups that view one another 
with hostility.20 The Court, I submit, has implicitly rendered the 
judgment that two factors determine the level of balkanization in 
American society: (1) the effect of using racial criteria on the 
condition of racial and ethnic minorities, and (2) the effect of using 
racial criteria on the degree of hostility present in members of the 
racial majority. The Court has sought to reduce balkanization by 
registering simultaneously that “race unfortunately still matters”21 in 
America and yet that racial criteria “may balkanize us into competing 
racial factions.”22 It has endeavored not “to perpetuate the hostilities 
that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid.”23 
I turn in Part III to race-conscious student assignment plans and 
suggest that the critical question is whether and when the use of race 
in student assignment exacerbates or ameliorates racial balkanization 
in America. The answer depends on the interests that school districts 
advance when they use race and the extent and impact of such use. 
I first explain why the Court should conclude that voluntary 
integration plans advance a compelling interest. School districts have 
a compelling interest in ensuring that public schools fulfill their 
primary mission. Both the Court and commentators have instructed 
that in addition to facilitating academic achievement, public schools 
are charged principally with socializing students to values of 
assimilation, national unity, and social harmony, and thus to the ideal 
 
 20. To balkanize is “to break up (as a region or group) into smaller and often hostile 
units.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 87 (10th ed. 2001). The Justices 
conceive the concept this way. See infra notes 22–23, 97–98, 245–47 and accompanying text. 
 21. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 22. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
 23. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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that Americans of every race and ethnicity must learn to live 
together. The interests that school boards can advance by integrating 
their schools are compelling because they are closely tied to the basic 
mission of public education in America. 
I next argue that the kind of individualized consideration 
required by the Court’s cases depends on how voluntary integration 
plans likely affect racial balkanization over the long term. I 
recommend an individualized consideration requirement that is 
modest in its demands because such plans can be expected to reduce 
balkanization so long as they make only limited use of racial 
classifications in granting or denying student requests for particular 
schools and do not impose significant burdens on individuals and 
families. Analyzed according to the three-part standard that I 
recommend, the Jefferson County plan likely meets the 
individualized consideration requirement that is most appropriate in 
this setting. The Seattle plan presents a closer case because of the 
greater burdens it may impose, but it too likely meets the 
requirement. 
I.  DEFINING INDIVIDUALIZED CONSIDERATION 
Several of the Court’s equal protection opinions use the term 
“individualized consideration,” but they do so without defining the 
concept. This lack of clarity can affect the quality of legal analysis by 
conflating relevant differences and encouraging false distinctions. I 
therefore begin with a definition. 
Whenever government seeks to accomplish an objective that 
requires it to distinguish among individuals—whether granting 
admission to a public university, awarding a government contract, 
placing persons in a legislative district, collecting census data, or 
assigning a student to a public school—government must articulate 
relevant criteria. These criteria may include standardized test scores, 
grade point averages, financial bids, political affiliations, places of 
residence, race, preferences for particular schools, and many other 
things. It is by applying the relevant criteria that government 
distinguishes among individuals. 
Conceptually, and putting aside constitutional law for the 
moment, “individualized consideration” means that government must 
determine whether a given individual meets the selection criteria by 
examining all of the individual’s relevant characteristics or 
circumstances, not just one characteristic that (like all individual 
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characteristics) is also a group characteristic. Whenever a government 
decision requires choices among individuals, this same two-step 
process is implicated: first government establishes the selection 
criteria; then it affords individualized consideration to the extent that 
it determines whether individuals meet these criteria based on all of 
their relevant characteristics. 
Definitionally, therefore, individualized consideration entails 
assessing an individual’s relevant characteristics against a standard of 
measurement. This is sometimes a purely mechanical exercise, 
requiring no discretionary choices. An example is determining 
whether a person lives within certain legislative boundaries. At other 
times, step two is highly discretionary. An example is deciding whom 
to hire to a law school faculty. 
The key normative question in any setting is implicated at step 
one: determining what the selection criteria should be. For example, 
are standardized tests and bidding wars unfair to economically 
disadvantaged individuals? Does a perfect grade point average from 
school A convey the same information as a perfect grade point 
average from school B? Turning to constitutional law, one of the most 
controversial normative questions in many settings is whether and 
when government may deem race a relevant selection criterion. 
What should not be controversial, however, is the basic analytical 
point that the concept of individualized consideration is perfectly 
consistent with the consideration of group characteristics, including 
race. Government cannot govern through generally applicable laws 
without distinguishing among individuals based on group 
characteristics; the criteria—any criteria—are defined by groups. For 
example, every potential criterion discussed above (test scores, 
grades, race, etc.) is both an individual characteristic or circumstance 
and a group characteristic or circumstance. Government distinguishes 
among individuals by valuing certain group characteristics over 
others. Accordingly, it is incorrect to suggest that individualized 
consideration necessarily includes a requirement of near 
colorblindness and thus is in serious tension with the consideration of 
race.24 If a public theater company were to perform a play on the life 
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the company would afford 
individualized consideration in selecting the best actor for the lead 
 
 24. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 17, at 16–17 (criticizing the Jefferson County Board of Education for not “minimizing the 
use of race in its assignment plan and maximizing the concept of individualized consideration”). 
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role, and this consideration would likely entail using race as a 
selection criterion. 
Again, the normative task is to decide which criteria are relevant 
to government’s choices among individuals. This task includes 
determining whether government should choose based on one 
criterion or multiple criteria, whether race may operate as one 
criterion, and if so, what weight race should be given and whether this 
weight may be publicly declared. Each of these questions is 
analytically separate from the existence of individualized 
consideration as a concept; nothing in the definition itself indicates 
whether government constitutionally may consider race. Rather, the 
extent to which race may be considered turns on the kind of 
individualized consideration that the Court deems the Constitution to 
require. 
The Court has spoken to this issue several times, and its answers 
have been context-sensitive. I begin with the cases concerning 
affirmative action in higher education. They involve the use of racial 
classifications to achieve certain social benefits, and the Court’s 
insistence on individualized consideration originates with them. Not 
coincidentally, this is a context in which the Court’s attention to racial 
balkanization has driven the formulation of legal doctrine. 
II.  LESSONS OF THE PAST 
A. Justice Powell’s Requirement of Individualized Consideration 
The story of individualized consideration as a legal requirement 
begins with the case in which the Court first addressed the 
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education, Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke.25 At issue was a challenge to the 
admissions program of the medical school of the University of 
California at Davis. The program openly set aside sixteen spots for 
minority applicants out of a class of one hundred.26 The Court divided 
three ways—four to one to four—and Justice Powell wrote the 
controlling, singular opinion. 
 
 25. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). For further discussion, see Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, 
Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring 
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 23–52), available at 
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001588/01/95_Cal._L._Rev._(2007).pdf. 
 26. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
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Powell rejected the argument that the use of racial classifications 
in affirmative action programs should not trigger strict scrutiny. He 
concluded that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are 
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial 
examination.”27 He also resisted the University’s attempt to justify 
affirmative action in higher education using the remedial logic of past 
discrimination.28 Instead, Powell focused on the “academic freedom” 
of universities to choose a student body that would ensure “‘wide 
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation 
of many peoples.” He thus developed a rationale for affirmative 
action in higher education that would allow universities to fulfill their 
“mission” of selecting “those students who will contribute the most to 
the ‘robust exchange of ideas.’”29 Powell conceived this kind of 
diversity as serving a compelling educational interest. 
On Powell’s account, diversity in higher education did not imply 
simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the 
student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected 
ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated 
aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling 
state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though 
important element.30 
Powell concluded that universities could use “race or ethnic 
background” as a “‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file,” but could not 
use race to “insulate the individual from comparison with all other 
candidates for the available seats.”31 That latter approach would deny 
each applicant his or her “right to individualized consideration 
without regard to . . . race.”32 
 
 27. Id. at 291. 
 28. See Brief of Petitioner University of California, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811), 1977 WL 189474, at *8–10, *13. 
 29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). Powell believed that this academic freedom of universities was of First 
Amendment concern. Id. 
 30. Id. at 315. 
 31. Id. at 317. Powell thought that such an admissions program was “flexible enough to 
consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each 
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily 
according them the same weight.” Id. 
 32. Id. at 318 n.52. 
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By contrast, a program that gave individuals a “plus” for their 
race 
treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The 
applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another 
candidate receiving a “plus” on the basis of ethnic background will 
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply 
because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It 
would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have 
included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the 
other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly 
and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of 
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.33 
Powell concluded that “[s]o long as the university proceeds on an 
individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial 
interference in the academic process.”34 He would approve affirmative 
action programs even if universities paid “some attention” to the 
numbers of minority students they admitted.35 The Davis program, 
however, set aside a certain number of slots for the admission of 
racial minorities. Thus, the program unconstitutionally created “the 
functional equivalent of a quota system.”36 
It may seem curious that Powell’s rationale would approve 
affirmative action programs only if they complied with the legal 
requirements of a system of “individualized consideration,” even 
though such a system would produce almost the same “net operative 
results” as explicit “set-aside[]” plans.37 Paul Mishkin, who had 
 
 33. Id. at 318. 
 34. Id. at 319 n.53. 
 35. Id. at 323. 
 36. Id. at 318. Although Mr. Bakke won his case, Powell’s opinion preserved affirmative 
action in higher education. Because affirmative action admissions programs did not need to use 
the features that Powell deemed fatal, Bakke’s primary effect, “by far, was to sustain race-
conscious special admissions programs throughout the nation.” Mishkin, supra note 15, at 921–
22. 
 37. Mishkin, supra note 15, at 928. Mishkin explained why, in the overwhelming majority of 
cases, there is little functional difference between “‘plus’-type” and “set-aside” systems: 
If an admissions committee is allowed to give a “plus” for race as a means of 
achieving diversity in the student body, that “plus” must be large enough to make a 
difference in the outcome in some cases. But if that is so, isn’t it clear that the size of 
the “plus” will determine the number of minority students admitted? In those 
circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that the authorities that determine the size of 
the “plus” will set that size in terms of the number of minority students likely to be 
produced at the level set. 
Id. at 926. 
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drafted the University’s brief, explained this puzzle by suggesting that 
“[e]ven when the net operative results may be the same, the use of 
euphemisms may serve valuable purposes; . . . they may facilitate the 
acceptance of needed measures.”38 Specifically, “[t]he indirectness of 
the less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages” 
in terms of “the felt impact of their operation over time”: 
The description of race as simply “another factor” among a lot of 
others considered in seeking diversity tends to minimize the sense 
that minority students are separate and different and the recipients 
of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and 
structured systems might have the opposite effect. These 
perceptions . . . . can facilitate or hamper the development of 
relationships among individuals and groups; they can advance or 
retard the educational process for all—including, particularly, 
minority students whose self-image is most crucially involved.39 
“Indirectness,” Mishkin wrote, may also help to mute public 
resentment of racial preferences: 
The use of overt numbers . . . greatly tends to trigger the symbolism 
of . . . exclusionary devices of past invidious . . . discrimination. The 
incorporation of such features . . . tends continually to keep alive 
consciousness of the program and the relevance of race therein; it 
tends to maintain and exacerbate latent and overt hostility to these 
efforts to overcome the effects of past racial discrimination. A 
program formulated along the lines Justice Powell’s opinion 
approves would, by the very lack of “sharp edges,” avoid such 
visibility in its operations and tend to enhance the acceptability of 
the program.40 
Regarding both the students enrolled and the public at large, 
different kinds of affirmative action programs would affect pre-
existing social beliefs about racial issues in critically different ways, 
even when they produced virtually identical results.41 
 
 38. Id. at 927–28. 
 39. Id. at 928. 
 40. Id. 
 41. John Jeffries has recorded similar observations: 
If the advantages accorded racial and ethnic minorities are not explicitly stated, they 
need not be explicitly undone. If adjustments are not announced and contested, a 
steady progression of divisive debates can perhaps be avoided. The burying of racial 
preferences in “plus” factors for certain individuals obscures and softens the sense of 
injury that even the most dedicated proponents of affirmative action must 
acknowledge will be felt by those who are disadvantaged for reasons they cannot 
control. 
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The unstable logic animating Powell’s distinction between 
constitutional and unconstitutional affirmative action programs was 
thus central to his attempt to craft “a wise and politic resolution of an 
exceedingly difficult problem.”42 His decisive differentiation between 
a quota and a “plus” factor enabled him “to equate race with other 
variables” that “do not carry the same emotional freight as racial or 
ethnic lines do.”43 He charged his individualized consideration 
requirement with diminishing the potential of affirmative action to 
“exacerbate latent and overt hostility to these efforts to overcome the 
effects of past racial discrimination.”44 
B. The Individualized Consideration Requirement of Grutter  
and Gratz 
Twenty-five years after Bakke, the Court revisited the 
constitutionality of affirmative action in higher education. In Grutter 
v. Bollinger,45 the Court sustained the affirmative action admissions 
program of the University of Michigan Law School.46 Because the 
program used racial classifications, Justice O’Connor reiterated for 
the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment “protect[s] persons, not 
groups,” and thus that all “governmental action based on race—a 
group classification long recognized as in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited—should be subjected to detailed 
judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection 
of the laws has not been infringed.”47 To protect this right, the Court 
reaffirmed—in agreement with Justice Powell in Bakke—that racial 
classifications trigger strict scrutiny,48 meaning that they “are 
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling 
governmental interests.”49 The Court then held—also seemingly in 
 
John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (2003). Cf. CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, 
JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE 149 (1996) (“[C]ontroversy has a price, and divisiveness takes 
its toll. In race matters, the price may be too high to justify the supposed benefits of 
transparency anyway.”). 
 42. Mishkin, supra note 15, at 929. 
 43. Id. at 924. 
 44. Id. at 928. 
 45. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 343–44. 
 47. Id. at 326 (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 227 (1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 48. Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). 
 49. Id. 
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agreement with Powell—“that the Law School has a compelling 
interest in attaining a diverse student body.”50 It so held because “a 
diverse student body is at the heart of the Law School’s proper 
institutional mission.”51 
The Court determined that the Law School’s “proper 
institutional mission” includes three goals, each of which depends on 
a racially diverse student body for its realization. First, the Law 
School “promotes learning outcomes” by producing lawyers trained 
to function “as professionals” and prepared to work within “an 
increasingly diverse workforce,” an objective whose attainment 
requires legal education to facilitate “cross-racial understanding.”52 
Second, the Law School prepares “students for . . . citizenship” as part 
of its “fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society,”53 a 
purpose whose fulfillment requires “[e]ffective participation by 
members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our 
Nation . . . if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.”54 
Third, the Law School trains “our Nation’s leaders,” a cadre that 
possesses “legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry” only insofar as “the 
path to leadership [is] visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity.”55 
Although the Court purported merely to be endorsing Justice 
Powell’s rationale in Bakke,56 Robert Post has shown that the Grutter 
Court’s understanding of diversity is distinctive. Because “Powell 
conceptualized diversity as a value intrinsic to the educational process 
itself,”57 and because most public institutions in America are not 
designed to promote the “‘robust exchange of ideas’”58 characteristic 
of a university education, “Powell’s explanation of the compelling 
interest of diversity did not reach very far beyond the specific context 
 
 50. Id. at 328. 
 51. Id. at 329. 
 52. Id. at 330 (quoting Brief for American Educational Research Association et al. as 
Amici Curiae at 3, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241)). 
 53. Id. at 331. 
 54. Id. at 332. 
 55. Id. The Court stressed that “[a]ll members of our heterogeneous society must have 
confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that provide this 
training.” Id. 
 56. Id. at 325 (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”). 
 57. Post, supra note 15, at 59–60. 
 58. Id. at 60 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) 
(opinion of Powell, J.)). 
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of higher education.”59 The Grutter Court, by stark contrast, 
“conceives of education as instrumental for the achievement of 
extrinsic social goods like professionalism, citizenship, or 
leadership”60—goods that many public institutions in America seek to 
advance. Because “the Law School can have a compelling interest in 
using diversity to facilitate the attainment of these social goods only if 
there is an independently compelling interest in the actual attainment 
of these goods,”61 these justifications seem pregnant with implications 
well beyond university life. 
The Grutter Court, unlike Powell in Bakke, “endorse[d] the 
practice of affirmative action for university admissions in terms that 
closely correspond to the reasons that actually sustain the practice.”62 
These reasons were animated almost entirely by “the felt need to 
remedy deep social dislocations associated with race.”63 The Court 
nonetheless used the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny to limit 
the de facto remedial options available. It stated that race-conscious 
affirmative action programs (1) must “not unduly harm members of 
any racial group”;64 (2) may be used only after a “serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives”;65 (3) “must be 
limited in time”;66 and (4) must afford “truly individualized 
consideration.”67 
It is plain that the Court placed primary importance on the 
fourth constraint. The Court adopted the individualized consideration 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 65. 
 63. Id. at 63. The Grutter Court thus invoked “our Nation’s struggle with racial inequality,” 
539 U.S. at 338, even as it declined to rely on remedial concerns explicitly. 
 64. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341. The Court held that the University met this requirement by 
satisfying the individualized consideration requirement. Id. 
 65. Id. at 339 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)). The 
Court did not view this requirement as onerous. See id. (“Narrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to 
choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide 
educational opportunities to members of all racial groups.”). 
 66. Id. at 342. It is hard to justify a time limit unless the purpose of the program is remedial 
or the purpose of the limit is to reduce the potential for racial balkanization. The interests that 
the Court attributed to the Law School are not time-sensitive. See infra notes 128, 273, 294. 
 67. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. The Court conceived individualized consideration itself as 
prohibiting quotas. Id. (“[T]ruly individualized consideration demands . . . . that universities 
[not] establish quotas for members of certain racial groups . . . .”). Sometimes courts present the 
ban on quotas as a separate requirement of narrow tailoring. 
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requirement from Powell’s opinion in Bakke, making “no 
independent effort to explain or justify” it,68 even though the Court’s 
articulation of the Law School’s compelling interests focused more 
specifically on race than Powell had. The Court simply mandated that 
“a university’s admissions program must remain flexible enough to 
ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a 
way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of 
his or her application.”69 The Court declared that “[t]he importance of 
this individualized consideration in the context of a race-conscious 
admissions program is paramount,”70 despite the fact that its 
identification of the Law School’s compelling interests appeared to 
“point in the opposite direction from an individualized consideration 
requirement.”71 If the Court was prepared to accept that the Law 
School requires a racially diverse student body in order to advance its 
compelling interests in professionalism, citizenship, and leadership, 
then it would seem sensible to conclude that the school “should 
precisely and decisively focus on race to the extent necessary to 
achieve these objectives.”72 
Following Powell’s lead in Bakke, however, the Court used the 
narrow tailoring inquiry to distinguish affirmative action programs 
that evaluate “each applicant . . . as an individual” from those that 
make “an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or 
her application.”73 Thus the Court in Gratz v. Bollinger74 wielded the 
individualized consideration requirement to invalidate the University 
of Michigan undergraduate affirmative action program, which 
awarded “20 points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee 
admission, to every single ‘underrepresented minority’ applicant 
solely because of race.”75 
As with Powell’s opinion in Bakke, it may seem difficult to 
explain what the Court in Grutter and Gratz was seeking to 
accomplish by insisting that universities afford a certain kind of 
individualized consideration to applicants. The Grutter Court 
 
 68. Post, supra note 15, at 69. 
 69. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Post, supra note 15, at 69. 
 72. Id. at 70. 
 73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
 74. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 75. Id. at 270. 
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declared that universities could use affirmative action to assemble “a 
critical mass of underrepresented minority students,”76 which meant 
the quantity of minority students needed to achieve “the educational 
benefits that diversity is designed to produce.”77 Thus, universities 
must “be free to regard race as an especially salient dimension of 
diversity.”78 This freedom, however, “seems inconsistent with the 
constitutional requirement that they treat applicants as unique 
persons rather than as members of racial groups.”79 As Mishkin 
noted,80 universities cannot use race to “assemble a critical mass of 
minority students unless race is the defining factor in a student’s 
application, even if it is ‘decisive’ only at the margins.”81 
Accordingly, the Court in Gratz likely invalidated Michigan’s 
undergraduate affirmative action program “because the program 
accorded to race the ‘specific and identifiable’ value of twenty 
points.”82 But because the Court upheld the Law School’s program, 
“which assigns race the specific value necessary to achieve a critical 
mass of minority students,” the fatal flaw of the undergraduate 
program must have been that the University made this value 
“‘identifiable.’”83 The implication is reminiscent of Powell’s logic in 
Bakke: if both programs “assign the same ‘specific’ value to race . . . 
and if the undergraduate program does so explicitly and the Law 
School implicitly, the former is unconstitutional, but not necessarily 
the latter.”84 By allowing universities to use race as a factor in 
ensuring a critical mass of minority students only to the extent that 
the exact size of this factor is unknown to the public, the Court 
effectively held that universities can engage in affirmative action but 
must occlude the extent to which they do so. 
Post accounts for this repudiation of transparency in much the 
same way that Mishkin did in analyzing Powell’s opinion in Bakke: 
 
 76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335. 
 77. Id. at 330. The Court deferred to the Law School regarding the need for a critical mass. 
Id. at 333 (“The Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that a 
‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its compelling interest in 
securing the education benefits of a diverse student body.”). 
 78. Post, supra note 15, at 72. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See supra note 37. 
 81. Post, supra note 15, at 72. 
 82. Id. at 73 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
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“the twenty-point bonus sends a message to applicants and to the 
world that being a member of a racial group is worth a certain, named 
amount, and it therefore invites members of that group to feel 
entitled to that amount.”85 Mishkin might have added that such a 
visible bonus invites resentment.86 But “[t]he potential for 
balkanization is muted within the Law School program . . . because 
the value assigned to race is camouflaged by an opaque process of 
implicit comparisons.”87 Although transparency is a core virtue of the 
rule of law,88 the Court in the Michigan cases, like Powell in Bakke, 
made a virtue of opacity.89 
The late Rehnquist Court registered that there were compelling 
reasons “for using affirmative action programs to address the social 
dislocations of race,”90 but it also feared that racial entitlements would 
encourage balkanization. The Court thus applied strict scrutiny 
so as to minimize the likelihood of racial balkanization by requiring 
affirmative action programs to accord symbolic priority to 
individuals, as distinct from racial groups, through the ideological 
assertion that each candidate is receiving “individualized 
consideration.” . . . Racial inequalities can be addressed, but only in 
ways that efface the social salience of racial differences.91 
The use of racial classifications in university admissions might 
exacerbate balkanization if such use were more apparent than 
necessary to accomplish the objective at hand. The Court endorsed an 
individualized consideration requirement that was designed to 
ameliorate this concern. 
Post, like Mishkin before him, focuses on the potential for 
balkanization caused by public reactions to race-conscious 
interventions by government. I suggest, however, that the 
 
 85. Id. at 74. 
 86. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 87. Post, supra note 15, at 74. 
 88. Id. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial 
Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2015–16 (2005) (discussing rule-
of-law values). Cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Equal 
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones who hide the ball.”); id. 
at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“If honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan’s accurately 
described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving similar 
numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”). 
 89. Post, supra note 15, at 74. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 75. 
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individualized consideration requirement of Bakke, Grutter, and 
Gratz is actually rooted in a two-fold appreciation: while the use of 
racial classifications might exacerbate balkanization if the magnitude 
of such use were publicly apparent, inequalities in part responsible for 
extant balkanization would go unaddressed if government were 
disabled from using race.92 
The above discussion does not mean, however, that the Court in 
Grutter and Gratz cared only about public perceptions. Stressing the 
importance of appearances is likely the most persuasive way to 
reconcile these decisions. But in neither case would the Court have 
allowed the University to use racial classifications as much as it 
wanted even if it had maintained proper appearances. For example, if 
the Law School had defined critical mass as, say, a 40 or 50 percent 
minority student population, the Court almost certainly would have 
invalidated its program. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s disagreement with 
the Grutter Court was not over whether race could be used explicitly, 
but over whether it had in fact been used too much.93 He read Powell 
in Bakke as allowing the use of “race as one, nonpredominant factor 
in a system designed to consider each applicant as an individual,” a 
use that was “modest” and “limited.”94 
C. Redistricting and Contracting 
Although never explicitly stated by the Court, the basic function 
of the individualized consideration requirement of Bakke, Grutter, 
and Gratz is to allay “the fear of racial ‘balkanization’”95 by reducing 
social controversy over affirmative action while simultaneously 
sustaining the constitutionality of legislative redress for the present 
effects of past discrimination. The Justices sought to achieve this 
 
 92. I express no view here on whether it is of paramount importance to maintain fidelity to 
such rule-of-law values as transparency in all circumstances, or whether rule-of-law virtues are 
appropriately trumped at times by other values and purposes of law, including the need for law 
to legitimate itself and the need to maintain social cohesion. For a theorization of the problem, 
see Post & Siegel, supra note 25. Similarly, I do not inquire whether the Court and 
commentators have overstated the importance of appearances in constitutional law. A critic 
might argue that citizens are able to “pierce the veil” and to apprehend that there is little 
functional difference between, say, a quota and a “plus” for race whose size is not identified 
publicly. 
 93. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“I reiterate 
my approval of giving appropriate consideration to race in this one context . . . .”). 
 94. Id. at 387. Justice Kennedy stressed that “individual consideration” ensures “that race 
does not become a predominant factor in the admissions decisionmaking.” Id. at 393. 
 95. Issacharoff, supra note 15, at 691. 
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balancing act by insisting that government use racial classifications in 
a way that is both limited and less apparent than it might otherwise 
be. In so insisting, the Court symbolically endorsed an ideological 
commitment to individualism when government was in fact treating 
people in part as members of racial groups in order to redress 
enduring social dislocations ultimately related to past racial 
injustices.96 
The Court explicitly spoke to the importance of social 
appearances in the area of legislative redistricting. Writing for the 
Court in Shaw v. Reno, Justice O’Connor revealed the Court’s hand 
in a way that she declined to do in Grutter: 
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A 
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who 
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by 
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in 
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an 
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the 
perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike, 
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same 
candidates at the polls. . . . By perpetuating such notions, a racial 
gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting 
that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. 
  The message that such districting sends to elected representatives 
is equally pernicious.97 
Because “appearances do matter,” one way to characterize the 
difference between Grutter and Gratz is that in Gratz the University 
 
 96. Social acceptance of affirmative action in higher education plainly mattered to Justices 
Powell and O’Connor. They likely believed that the institution served important societal 
interests, see generally Jeffries, supra note 41, and they may have wanted to avoid triggering a 
legislative backlash. Cf. Sandra Day O’Connor, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 
HARV. L. REV. 395, 396 (1987) (“Perhaps most vivid in my mind is the acute appreciation that 
[Powell] has always shown for the delicate and profoundly important legacy of Brown v. Board 
of Education.” (emphasis added)). Justice Powell was exquisitely attuned to the importance of 
public acceptance of governmental action on racial questions: 
Our people instinctively resent coercion, and perhaps most of all when it affects their 
children and the opportunities that only education affords them. It is now reasonably 
clear that the goal of diversity that we call integration, if it is to be lasting and 
conducive to quality education, must have the support of parents who so frequently 
have the option to choose where their children will attend school. 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 97. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–48 (1993) (citations omitted). 
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had created a scheme of using racial criteria that the Court feared 
might “balkanize us into competing racial factions.”98 
No concept of individualized consideration is thought to be 
implicated in the context of reapportionment. This is because 
redistricting, by its very nature, is a process in which only groups of 
voters, not individuals, are considered in drawing district lines 
regardless of whether race comes into play. This understanding, 
however, confuses government’s establishment of the selection 
criteria (the first step identified in Part I) with government’s 
determination of who meets these criteria (step two, which concerns 
individualized consideration). In redistricting, controversy surrounds 
the issue of which criteria—especially race—should be deemed 
relevant, not whether a particular individual meets the criteria. The 
criteria, once established, can be applied mechanically (that is, 
without exercising discretion): one is either in the district or is not.99 
But because government places the individual in one district or 
another based on all of the relevant selection criteria, the conduct of 
government in the reapportionment process meets the definition of 
individualized consideration. 
The Court has policed the extent to which government may use 
race as a selection criterion by holding that strict scrutiny is triggered 
when the plaintiffs 
show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape 
and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative 
purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the 
legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within 
or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff 
must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral 
districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, 
 
 98. Id. at 657.   
 99. In terms of the exercise of discretion, the distinction between redistricting and 
university admissions is far from crisp. Groups of applicants with high (or low) test scores and 
grades receive little or no consideration of their other attributes—they are near automatically 
admitted (or rejected). Such consideration primarily occurs regarding applicants in the middle 
group, who are also the most likely to be helped or hurt by the existence of the affirmative 
action program. In both contexts, the people who are clearly in or out based on factors other 
than race—whether street address or grades—receive little consideration of their other qualities 
or circumstances but are also not affected by the use of racial criteria. 
02__SIEGEL.DOC 1/11/2007  10:44 AM 
2006] RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT 803 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities 
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.100 
The notion of race as the predominant factor, though used by the 
Court to decide whether to apply strict scrutiny (and not as part of 
the application of strict scrutiny101), is a kind of individualized 
consideration requirement because it functions to prevent 
government from using race too much as a proxy for political 
interests. Indeed, Justice Kennedy explicitly used the “predominant 
factor” language in Grutter.102 
In a different equal protection context, the Court demands that 
government not use race as a proxy at all when individualized 
consideration is feasible. The Court makes robust use of this 
colorblindness conception of individualized consideration in the 
context of affirmative action in government contracting. In City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,103 the Court applied strict scrutiny and 
struck down a city plan that required prime contractors awarded city 
construction contracts to subcontract at least 30 percent of the dollar 
amount of each contract to one or more Minority Business 
Enterprises (MBEs).104 Writing for the Court, Justice O’Connor 
stressed the importance of “an individualized procedure” in this 
setting: 
Since the city must already consider bids and waivers on a case-by-
case basis, it is difficult to see the need for a rigid numerical 
quota. . . . [T]he Richmond Plan’s waiver system focuses solely on 
 
 100. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (emphasis added). In Easley v. Cromartie, 
532 U.S. 234 (2001), the Court wrote that in order to establish that race and not politics 
predominated 
where majority-minority districts . . . are at issue and where racial identification 
correlates highly with political affiliation, the party attacking the legislatively drawn 
boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its 
legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with 
traditional districting principles. That party must also show that those districting 
alternatives would have brought about significantly greater racial balance. 
Id. at 258. 
 101. It is not clear whether this doctrinal distinction makes much of a relevant difference. 
The Court has never held that a redistricting scheme uses race as “the predominant factor” but 
survives strict scrutiny. Several Justices, however, have assumed or suggested that the 
predominant use of race in redistricting would be constitutional when necessary to remedy past 
discrimination or to comply with the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 
982–83 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 992 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 103. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 104. Id. at 511. 
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the availability of MBE’s; there is no inquiry into whether or not the 
particular MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the 
effects of past discrimination by the city or prime contractors.105 
The Court appeared to say that government should not use race at all 
because the only defensible interest that could possibly be implicated 
(in Croson, remedying the effects of prior proven discrimination) 
could be advanced through individualized consideration.106 Suspecting 
that Richmond had created a racial spoils system,107 the Court 
subordinated the social salience of race; it deemed individualism and 
merit paramount. The Court crafted constitutional principles that it 
believed were animated by “[t]he dream of a Nation of equal citizens 
in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and 
achievement.”108 
 
 105. Id. at 508 (citations omitted). In this passage, Justice O’Connor referenced Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), a case in which the Court sustained a federal law requiring local-
government recipients of federal public works monies to set aside 10 percent of the funds for 
minority-owned businesses, id. at 492. Fullilove almost certainly has not survived Croson and 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), a contracting case in which the Court 
held that strict scrutiny also applies to federal affirmative action. Besides Fullilove, the only 
other case in which the Court has upheld a set-aside is United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 
(1987), which involved a court-ordered remedy for proven discrimination, id. at 153. 
 106. Cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 238 (“[U]nresolved questions remain concerning the details of 
the complex regulatory regimes implicated by the use of subcontractor compensation clauses. 
For example, the [law’s] 8(a) program requires an individualized inquiry into the economic 
disadvantage of every participant, whereas the . . . regulations implementing [another law] do 
not require certifying authorities to make such individualized inquiries. And the regulations 
seem unclear as to whether 8(d) subcontractors must make individualized showings, or instead 
whether the race-based presumption applies both to social and economic disadvantage.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 107. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 495–96, 510–11 (plurality opinion). 
 108. Id. at 505–06 (majority opinion). The Court recently stressed the importance of a 
similar kind of individualized consideration in holding that strict scrutiny controls an equal 
protection challenge to a state prison policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells for 
up to sixty days each time they enter a new correctional facility: 
Indeed, the United States argues . . . that it is possible to address “concerns of prison 
security through individualized consideration without the use of racial segregation, 
unless warranted as a necessary and temporary response to a race riot or other 
serious threat of race-related violence.” As to transferees, in particular, whom the 
[state] has already evaluated at least once, it is not clear why more individualized 
determinations are not possible. 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) (citation omitted). Likewise, Justice Stevens, 
who would have “h[e]ld the policy unconstitutional on the current record,” id. at 517 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting), rather than remanding for application of strict scrutiny, concluded that “the 
[state] has failed to explain why it could not, as an alternative to automatic segregation, rely on 
an individualized assessment of each inmate’s risk of violence when assigning him to a cell in a 
reception center,” id. at 521. The context is different from Croson and Adarand, but the 
Johnson Court also seemed to insist on individualized consideration in a colorblind sense. Not 
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D. The Pattern in the Case Law 
The case law permits a generalization. When government makes 
distinctions among people based on relevant criteria, the legal 
requirement of individualized consideration insists that government 
not overuse race: it must not treat individuals “too much” as members 
of racial groups, whether by literally overusing race or by needlessly 
impressing upon them and others that it is treating them in part as 
members of racial groups. What varies by context is the Court’s 
answer to the question of how much use of race is too much. At one 
extreme, not using race too much imposes few constraints. At the 
other, not using race too much means not using race at all. 
Considering the foregoing strands of equal protection doctrine 
together, it is possible to discern a pattern regarding the kind of 
individualized consideration (IC) that the Court demands. The key 
consideration, I suggest, is the Court’s judgment about how 
government’s use of race is likely to impact racial balkanization in 
America over the long run. I capture the pattern in Figure 1: 
Figure 1.  Effect of Perceived Potential for Greater Balkanization on 








At the left end of the spectrum are cases in which the Court 
views the robust—indeed, potentially exclusive—use of race as a 
selection criterion as compatible with the legal requirement of 
individualized consideration, either because such use will reduce 
balkanization by providing a constitutional remedy for race-based 
wrongs, or because the use of race is functional and will not cause 
balkanization. In United States v. Paradise, a remedial example, the 
Court upheld a federal court order that the Alabama Department of 
Public Safety hire or promote a qualified African American every 
 
using race as a proxy for the state’s interest in security likely means not using race at all, except 
in an emergency. 
minimum risk of 
increasing balkanization 
maximum risk of 
increasing balkanization 
IC imposes few limits 
on using race 
IC requires that race  
not be overused 
IC requires that race 
not be used 
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time it hired or promoted a white person as a remedy for proven 
racial discrimination.109 Functional uses of race include collecting 
racial statistics like census data110 or responding to a social emergency 
like a prison race riot.111 In these functional instances, race is the only 
selection criterion, and yet there is no violation of the individualized 
consideration requirement. Also likely in the functional category 
would be a preference for Arab Americans when the purpose was to 
select undercover agents who would infiltrate a Middle Eastern 
terrorist organization. 
Toward the middle of the continuum are the cases in which the 
use of race possesses the potential both to reduce pre-existing 
balkanization and to exacerbate balkanization by distinguishing 
among people along racial lines. An example is affirmative action in 
higher education. The Court in this setting insists that government 
not overuse race as a factor in admissions. This insistence includes a 
requirement that the use of race be no more salient than necessary. 
By attending to symbolic considerations and to the compromising of 
conventional notions of merit, the Court frees itself to give legal voice 
to its recognition of the social benefits associated with affirmative 
action admissions. In allowing the discreet use of race, the Court 
expects that the net effect on balkanization in American society will 
be negative because universities will ameliorate a balkanizing status 
quo (which exists when they enroll few minorities) without provoking 
severe racial hostilities and increasing balkanization on balance. The 
Court does not appear very concerned about the individual burdens 
imposed by affirmative action in this setting, perhaps because 
compliance with the individualized consideration requirement eases 
 
 109. See supra note 105. 
 110. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 18 (2003) (“[C]ourts seem to 
act on the belief that a group-based classification must inflict some dignitary or distributive 
harm to violate the anticlassification principle when they uphold the use of race in census or 
suspect descriptions on the ground that the classification is permissible because it merely 
describes social realities.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[O]nly a 
social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a prison 
race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates—can justify an exception to the principle 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’” (citations omitted)). 
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the felt impact of the burdens, and because the consequences of not 
gaining admission to a specific school are seldom severe.112 
The Court also seeks to prevent the overuse of race in 
redistricting. The predominant factor test in effect prohibits 
government from using race too much in drawing district lines. The 
idea of merit is irrelevant in reapportionment and the social benefits 
of empowering minorities to cast a more effective vote are at least 
partially offset by the social costs of reducing the voting power of 
whites placed in majority-minority districts. Accordingly, the Court 
seems concerned about the burdens imposed on certain groups of 
white voters by the use of race and especially about the balkanizing 
message that race-conscious redistricting can send.113 
Toward the other end of the continuum, for instance where 
affirmative action in government contracting is at issue, the Court 
requires compliance with an individualized consideration requirement 
that precludes government from using race as a selection criterion in 
choosing among individuals. The Court seems most attracted to this 
approach in contexts where conventional notions of merit are socially 
salient, the use of race imposes definite burdens on individuals, and 
the Court suspects that government is using race in the service of a 
balkanizing racial politics rather than in the public interest. 
Judging from the case law, therefore, the type of individualized 
consideration required by the Court turns on a judicial judgment 
about the probable net effect of using racial criteria on balkanization 
in American society. Because balkanization is no doubt a 
phenomenon that is difficult, if not impossible, to measure, this 
judgment is likely resistant to empirical falsification.114 Such a 
judgment is also relative because intergroup hostility is always a 
matter of degree. The Court does not—indeed, cannot—articulate 
what degree of racial hostility is constitutionally unacceptable, but it 
 
 112. It is also true that any given white applicant suffers only a modest decrease in his or her 
chances of being admitted by virtue of the existence of the program. See generally Goodwin Liu, 
The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 1045 (2002). Whether white applicants perceive the situation this way, however, is another 
matter. For whites in the middle range of applicants, moreover, the existence of the affirmative 
action program has a greater impact on their chances of gaining admission. See supra note 99. 
 113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 114. This is not to say, however, that judgments about balkanization are merely intuitive, 
impressionistic, and thus incapable of rational persuasion. See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the 
potential for balkanization in the context of voluntary integration plans relative to affirmative 
action in higher education). 
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does seem consistently concerned about whether the use of racial 
criteria is likely to make matters better or worse on balance. 
There is a temporal dimension to this determination. The Court 
seems attuned to the net impact on racial balkanization over the long 
haul.115 For example, the Court no doubt anticipated that the race-
conscious remedies mandated by Brown v. Board of Education116 
would increase interracial hostility in the short run because of white 
resistance. The Court, however, likely believed that these costs were 
acceptable in part because it expected that dismantling a regime of 
apartheid would encourage a long-term reduction in balkanization.117 
Another difficulty is that the same use of racial criteria may 
cause race-based hostility to increase among members of one racial 
group and to decrease among members of another racial group. For 
example, an affirmative action program may cause more resentment 
among some whites but less resentment among some minorities than 
would exist in the absence of the program. No decision rule is 
available to explain how the Court’s judgment about balkanization 
proceeds in these circumstances. The Court seems to make an all-
things-considered determination regarding the overall effect of using 
race on balkanization, a determination whose principal focus varies 
depending on the circumstances. When invidious discrimination on 
the basis of race has been proven, the Court is more concerned about 
 
 115. Of course, the long run cannot be so long that the exercise in anticipating balkanization 
becomes entirely speculative. Accordingly, concerns about a short-term increase in 
balkanization when government uses race cannot be overcome by only a remote possibility of 
gains in the distant future. 
 116. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 117. To be sure, a noninstrumental moral judgment animated the Court in Brown I and 
Brown II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). I submit, however, that a long-term instrumental judgment about 
balkanization was also implicated in Brown. After all, Brown I said nothing of implementation, 
and Chief Justice Warren campaigned for unanimity in order to reduce Southern resistance. See 
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 686 (Vintage Books 2004) (1975) (“Warren did 
not want dissents or concurrences if he could help it.”). Put differently, if the Brown Court had 
been persuaded that the country would never accept the overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896), it is unlikely that Brown would have come out the way that it did. This 
suggestion may make some squeamish about the notion of balkanization as a normative 
criterion, but its descriptive accuracy helps to explain where constitutional law comes from, how 
it legitimates itself, and why it changes over time. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown and 
Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 488 (2005) (“This seismic shift in Brown’s 
status—from a much-criticized ruling that divided public opinion to a sacrosanct decision that is 
well-nigh universally applauded—may suggest that the Court’s legitimacy flows less from the 
soundness of its legal reasoning than from its ability to predict future trends in public opinion.”); 
see also infra notes 134–35. 
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the potential hostility among members of minority groups if 
government does not allow explicit use of racial criteria in providing a 
remedy. In educational settings and redistricting, the Court seems 
concerned about ameliorating the potential hostility among members 
of all racial groups. In government contracting, the potential hostility 
among whites appears paramount. 
The Court’s judgment about the net effect of using racial criteria 
on balkanization seems to depend on several considerations. One is 
the Court’s view of the symbolic message conveyed by the use of race. 
The Court can be “uncomfortable”118 with robust expressions that 
“race matters” because it views them as potentially self-fulfilling: 
when government stresses the significance of race, this may cause 
citizens and public officials to act in ways that render race more 
salient. The country would then move farther away from the ideal of 
an America in which race no longer matters in public life. As Parts 
II.A and II.B demonstrated, this concern animated the Court’s 
distinction between racial quotas and the use of race as a “plus” 
factor in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz. And as Part II.C showed, the 
Court explicitly invoked this concern in the contexts of redistricting 
and government contracting.119 
Another consideration apparent from the cases is the Court’s 
view of the burdens that using race imposes on individuals. Racial 
classifications that impose substantial burdens on individuals by 
virtue of their membership in certain racial groups are particularly 
likely to cause race-based hostility. Thus the Court in Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education120 invalidated a board of education’s 
effort to increase teacher diversity in its schools by laying off certain 
white faculty with greater seniority than certain African American 
teachers who were retained.121 Writing for the plurality, Justice Powell 
underscored the burdens involved in using race as a criterion of job 
termination. “[A]s a means of accomplishing purposes that otherwise 
may be legitimate,” he stated, “the Board’s layoff plan is not 
sufficiently narrowly tailored. Other, less intrusive means of 
accomplishing similar purposes—such as the adoption of hiring 
goals—are available.”122 Individual burdens that attract the Court’s 
 
 118. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 119. See id.; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 120. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion). 
 121. Id. at 284. 
 122. Id. at 283–84 (footnote omitted). 
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attention tend to be tangible and distributive, as in Wygant, but they 
may also be dignitary,123 as in the several affirmative action cases in 
which certain Justices opine that racial classifications are inherently 
demeaning.124 
The Court also considers the extent to which consideration of 
individual merit is possible. The Court seems concerned about what it 
regards as the unfairness of distorting a competitive process of 
evaluation, whether the relevant merit-based qualifications are 
grades, as in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, or the ability to submit a low 
bid on a government contract, as in Croson and Adarand. Such 
concerns are not always paramount (or even implicated) in the case 
law, but when consideration of individual merit is possible and the 
Court regards the social benefits of using race as small, the merit 
factor can be important. 
Also significant is the degree to which the Justices believe that 
the use of race would facilitate the realization of significant social 
benefits. Such benefits might accrue because race or ethnicity is 
functionally central to some contemporary, important purpose of 
government that has no relation to balkanization—for example, 
selecting Arab American agents to infiltrate certain terrorist 
organizations or compiling racial statistics or census data. But the use 
of race could also secure significant social benefits by remedying the 
social dislocations of race and thus reducing balkanization that pre-
exists the current use of racial classifications (and is often related to 
the past use of very different kinds of racial classifications). In such 
circumstances, the Court has been prepared to register that America 
is a society “in which race unfortunately still matters.”125 The more the 
Court deems it important to allow sensitivity to social problems either 
caused in part by a history of racial apartheid or related to the 
broader salience of race in our increasingly multiracial society, the 
less the Court will demand in terms of an individualized consideration 
requirement that limits the ability of government to use race as a 
selection criterion. Remedies for de jure segregation are apt 
 
 123. See supra note 110. 
 124. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Constitution abhors classifications based on 
race, not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are based on illegitimate 
motives, but also because every time the government places citizens on racial registers and 
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”). 
 125. Id. at 333 (majority opinion). 
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examples. So are Paradise and the previously documented remedial 
logic that partially animates Bakke and Grutter. When, by contrast, 
the Court believes that the use of race will likely increase 
balkanization, it demands compliance with an individualized 
consideration requirement that prohibits government from using race 
as a selection criterion at all. Croson and Adarand illustrate this 
phenomenon.126 
The above considerations—expressive message, individual 
burdens, relevance of merit, and social benefits—collectively 
determine the Court’s view of the likely net effect of using racial 
criteria on balkanization and thus the kind of individualized 
consideration that it requires. Accordingly, these factors determine 
where a case falls along the continuum shown in Figure 1.127 
The foregoing analysis suggests a striking relationship among 
anticipated balkanization, individualized consideration, and 
government’s use of race as a selection criterion. The Court’s view of 
the likely long-term effect of using race on balkanization determines 
the kind of individualized consideration that it requires, which in turn 
polices the extent to which government may use racial criteria as 
relevant criteria in distinguishing among individuals. 
Of course, some of the considerations discussed in the previous 
pages are ordinarily categorized in the doctrine as elements of narrow 
tailoring, and individualized consideration is typically conceived as 
just one element of narrow tailoring. But my interpretation of the 
doctrine suggests that something else is going on: what the Court says 
it is doing to ensure a proper fit128 is often being done to minimize 
 
 126. One might suggest that I have repeatedly referenced “the Court” when I am really 
referencing the idiosyncratic influence of Justice O’Connor. Her Grutter opinion, however, 
attracted five votes. Justice Breyer, moreover, joined all but the last sentence of her 
concurrence in Gratz. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). More importantly, there is nothing unique about the influence of Justice 
O’Connor. Whenever the Court is divided five to four in an area, the possibility exists that one 
Justice will control outcomes. See Neil S. Siegel, Dole’s Future: A Strategic Analysis, 16 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 14 n.46, on file with the author) (“[T]he Court is 
not a unitary actor.”). When this happens, the majority opinions remain those of the Court, not 
of one Justice. In any event, my framework provides a way to understand the Court’s decisions 
regardless of whether the views of a particular Justice drove them. 
 127. Figure 1 reduces a multi-dimensional problem to one dimension because a concern 
with balkanization underlies the Court’s consideration of each factor. 
 128. The Court has stated that narrow tailoring requires the means to “‘fit’” the compelling 
end “‘so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was 
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.’” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (quoting City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). The analysis of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz in Part 
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balkanization, so that the other components of the narrow tailoring 
inquiry serve the same function as the individualized consideration 
requirement. 
This reading of the doctrine reveals the error in the assertion that 
controlling principles of equal protection prohibit government from 
treating individuals as members of racial groups.129 Colorblindness is 
not a reasonable interpretation of the case law because it collapses 
the context-sensitive continuum defined by the Court’s decisions. The 
claim animating the colorblindness position is either that the level of 
racial balkanization in American society is irrelevant to constitutional 
analysis, or that the only source of balkanization that matters is social 
hostility to racial criteria. Neither assertion can be reconciled with the 
Court’s decisions.130 
Indeed, colorblindness discourse cannot make sense of even the 
most settled constitutional understandings. In the student assignment 
cases before the Court, for example, the United States has declared 
that it “remains deeply committed to th[e] objective” of 
“effectuat[ing] a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school 
system.”131 But from the colorblind perspective that heavily influences 
the federal government’s briefs,132 it is not clear why the use of race to 
remedy even proven de jure school segregation is constitutionally 
permissible. If equal protection means that government must not 
treat individuals as members of racial groups (except perhaps in an 
emergency), and if a race-conscious remedy burdens individual 
students who are not guilty of racial discrimination and benefits 
individual students who may not have been victims of racial 
 
II, however, shows that the narrow tailoring inquiry constrains the use of racial criteria in ways 
that have nothing to do with “fit” and that are instead responsive to the potential for racial 
balkanization. See supra note 66; infra notes 273, 294. 
 129. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At 
the heart of this interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the 
government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious 
groups.”). 
 130. Of course, some Justices and commentators disagree with the normative premise of this 
Article and reject the Court’s relevant decisions as constitutionally authoritative. 
 131. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (quoting 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955)). 
 132. But see infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text (noting the view of the United States 
that the interest in avoiding minority student isolation is “unquestioned” and “undoubtedly 
legitimate and important”). 
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discrimination, as remedies for de jure segregation typically do,133 then 
the use of race in remedying the constitutional violation ought to be 
ruled out of bounds. Because almost everyone approves the use of 
race in this context, and because those who do not would be 
ostracized from the interpretive community if they said so publicly, it 
follows that a commitment to colorblindness does not accurately 
capture the circumstances in which race-conscious state action 
comports with equal protection. 
The Court has deemed permissible the use of race to remedy de 
jure segregation, even when innocent individuals are burdened and 
nonvictims are helped, in part because the Court expects that such 
use will reduce balkanization over the long run (even if it may 
provoke fierce resistance in the short run) by dismantling the primary 
historical cause of such balkanization.134 But if this is right, it is not 
evident why the Court should restrict such a judgment to instances of 
de jure segregation. And in fact the Court has not done so.135 
I turn now to race-conscious student assignment plans. The key 
question is where such plans lie along the balkanization continuum in 
Figure 1. The answer depends on (1) the interests supporting the 
plans and (2) the extent, impact, and salience of the use of race.136 
 
 133. Cf. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 110, at 24 n.53 (“To apply Brown in a meaningful way, 
courts had to invalidate school assignment practices in districts where there was some degree of 
racial mixing in school attendance patterns.”). 
 134. If resistance persists, however, the Court eventually pulls back. See CHARLES T. 
CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 181–85 
(2004) (reporting that white opposition and conservative judicial appointments limited increases 
in interracial contact during the post-Brown era); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 110, at 29 
(“Beginning in the 1970s the federal courts . . . slowed the project of disestablishing racial 
hierarchy, thus achieving a compromise on race relations that large numbers of whites sought.”); 
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional 
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1475 (2004) (“The debates over Brown’s 
implementation show the complex ways in which concerns about legitimacy have moved courts 
to mask and to limit a constitutional regime that would intervene in the affairs of the powerful 
on behalf of the powerless.”). 
 135. I do not examine why the Court has employed balkanization as a normative criterion of 
constitutional judgment in its equal protection jurisprudence. Elsewhere I have explored this 
question with Robert Post. See Post & Siegel, supra note 25 (theorizing the dialectic between 
legal legitimacy and public legitimacy). I merely suggest here that the primary considerations 
appear to have been the need for the Court to preserve the preconditions of its public 
legitimation over time, as well as a felt responsibility to reduce social conflict over racial issues. 
See id.; supra note 96 (quoting Justices Powell and O’Connor); supra note 134 (quoting Reva 
Siegel’s historical work on race and legitimation); Siegel, supra note 134, at 1544–46 (discussing 
the legitimacy concerns that pervade constitutional discourse on equality). 
 136. The Court’s concerns about balkanization are relevant under both prongs of strict 
scrutiny. The Court is more likely to view an end as compelling if it believes that pursuing the 
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III.  CHALLENGES OF THE PRESENT 
A. Compelling Interest 
1. Two Voluntary Integration Plans.  School districts that use 
race as a factor in student assignment typically assert that racially 
integrated schools (1) confer civic, social, and educational benefits of 
great importance and (2) reduce minority student isolation in 
educationally inferior schools.137 
For example, the case involving the Jefferson County Public 
Schools (JCPS) in Kentucky concerns the constitutionality of the 
school board’s “managed choice” plan. It requires, with a few 
exceptions, that all elementary, middle, and secondary schools “seek 
a Black student enrollment of at least 15% and no more than 
50%, . . . reflect[ing] a broad range equally above and below [the 
34%] Black student enrollment systemwide.”138 The plan categorizes 
students into integrated attendance zones, called “resides areas,” and 
uses the zones in making initial assignments. The plan then permits 
students to express preferences among schools and programs within 
the zones. Students who are not satisfied with their initial assignment 
or preference-based placement can request a transfer within or 
beyond their attendance zone. Before considering a student’s race, 
the JCPS makes assignments based on “place of residence, school 
capacity, program popularity, random draw and the nature of the 
student’s choices.”139 The racial guidelines are used mostly at the 
elementary school level, though they also apply to transfer requests at 
 
end will reduce balkanization. And in evaluating which means are acceptable, the Court 
implicitly insists that any race-conscious means chosen be no more balkanizing than necessary 
to achieve the end. 
 137. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The negative 
consequences of racial isolation that Lynn seeks to avoid and the benefits of diversity that it 
hopes to achieve are rooted in the same central idea: that all students are better off in racially 
diverse schools. We therefore restate the interests at stake here as obtaining the educational 
benefits of a racially diverse student body.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). Under the Lynn, 
Massachusetts plan, which the Court declined to review before Justice O’Connor retired, see 
supra note 11, “each student is entitled to attend his or her neighborhood school. Students who 
do not wish to attend their neighborhood school may apply to transfer to another school. 
Approval of a transfer depends, in large part, on the requesting student’s race and the racial 
makeup of the transferor and transferee schools,” Comfort, 418 F.3d at 6. 
 138. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 842 (W.D. Ky. 2004), 
aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of 
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). 
 139. Id. 
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every level and to high school freshmen who apply for “open 
enrollment” at a school outside their residential area.140 
According to the district court, the plan reflects the “JCPS’s 
ongoing commitment to racial integration within its individual 
schools.”141 Chief Judge Heyburn described the school board’s 
interests as sounding in the virtues of integration, perhaps in part 
because the district had been subject to a desegregation decree from 
1975 until 2000: 
The occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of 
Education has generated much discussion regarding whether that 
ruling has fulfilled its original promise. To give all students the 
benefits of an education in a racially integrated school and to 
maintain community commitment to the entire school system 
precisely express the Board’s own vision of Brown’s promise. The 
benefits the JCPS hopes to achieve go to the heart of its educational 
mission: (1) a better academic education for all students; (2) better 
appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students; 
(3) more competitive and attractive public schools; and (4) broader 
community support for all JCPS schools.142 
The court determined that the Grutter Court’s emphases on 
professionalism, citizenship, and leadership were equally relevant “to 
students in racially integrated public schools.”143 It further determined 
that “[o]ther benefits” sought by the school board were “quite 
different from those articulated in Grutter” but “seem equally 
compelling”—namely, “educational benefits for students of all races,” 
including “academic achievement”144 and the creation of “a system of 
 
 140. Id. at 844–45. I omit discussion of specialized schools and programs not at issue in the 
cases before the Court. 
 141. Id. at 840. 
 142. Id. at 836 (footnote omitted). 
 143. Id. at 853. According to the court, “[s]everal JCPS witnesses testified that, in a racially 
integrated learning environment, students learn tolerance towards others from different races, 
develop relationships across racial lines and relinquish racial stereotypes.” Id. “These values,” 
the court reported, “carry over to their relationships in college and in the workplace. As a 
result, these students are better prepared for jobs in a diverse workplace and exhibit greater 
social and intellectual maturity with their peers in the classroom and at their job.” Id. 
 144. Id. The court did not “resolve th[e] ongoing debate” about the extent to which 
integration benefits black students “in terms of academic achievement,” deferring instead to the 
school board’s judgment that integration benefits all students academically because there were 
“valid reasons for believing its policies have succeeded”—namely, that “[o]ver the past twenty-
five years, White and Black students in JCPS have progressed by every measure.” Id. at 853–54 
& n.39. 
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roughly equal components, not one urban system and another 
suburban system, not one rich and another poor, not one Black and 
another White.”145 The court concluded that “the arguments favoring 
the Board’s compelling interest are so objectively overwhelming” that 
the question whether it would accord “deference” to the board’s 
educational judgment was “immaterial.”146 
In contrast to the JCPS, Seattle School District Number 1 has 
never been adjudicated guilty of de jure segregation,147 and its “open 
choice” race-conscious assignment plan applies only to secondary 
schools. The plan allows incoming ninth-graders to select any of the 
ten high schools in the district. The plan provides that if the racial 
composition of an oversubscribed high school (i.e., a school that more 
students want to attend than capacity allows) “differs by more than 15 
percent from the racial make up of the students of the Seattle public 
schools as a whole,” and “if the sibling preference does not bring the 
oversubscribed high school within plus or minus 15 percent of the 
District’s demographics” of 60 percent minority and 40 percent white, 
then “the race-based tiebreaker is ‘triggered’ and the race of the 
applying student is considered.”148 
 
 145. Id. at 854. “It creates a perception, as well as the potential reality, of one community of 
roughly equal schools. Student choice and integrated schools, the Board believes, invest parents 
and students alike with a sense of participation and a positive stake in their schools and the 
school system as a whole.” Id. 
 146. Id. at 852. 
 147. The atmospherics of the two cases are different. While the McFarland court touted 
integration, the Ninth Circuit stressed racial diversity. This may be because only the JCPS had 
been subject to a desegregation decree, and the primary goal of its assignment plan was to 
maintain integrated schools once the decree was lifted. Legally, however, this distinction would 
not seem to make a relevant difference. It is certainly counterintuitive that the same state action 
that was required by law before the decree was lifted became prohibited by law the moment 
that decree was lifted. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 329 (“Have we reached a point of ‘terminal 
silliness’ in constitutional law where school districts are prohibited from doing what federal 
courts were ordering them to do just a few years ago?” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting))). But this rationale for “play in the joints” between what 
equal protection requires and what it prohibits would seem to suggest not that the JCPS plan is 
less suspect than the Seattle plan, but that neither is constitutionally dubious. Cf. Locke v. 
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004) (“[T]here are some state actions permitted by the 
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.”). 
 148. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1169–70 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908). After sibling 
preference and race, “students are admitted according to distance from the student’s home to 
the high school. . . . In any given oversubscribed school, the distance-based tiebreaker accounts 
for between 70 to 75 percent of admissions to the ninth grade.” Id. at 1171. 
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The Ninth Circuit described the school district’s interests as (1) 
“the affirmative educational and social benefits that flow from racial 
diversity” and (2) “avoid[ance of] the harms resulting from racially 
concentrated or isolated schools.”149 As to the first set of interests, the 
court approved the district’s expert testimony that a racially diverse 
educational experience causes “improved critical thinking skills” for 
students of all races; an “improvement in race-relations” and “the 
reduction of prejudicial attitudes”; and the opening of “opportunity 
networks in areas of higher education and employment,” as well as a 
greater likelihood that graduates will “live in integrated 
communities” and “have cross-race friendships later in life.”150 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he District’s interests in the 
educational and social benefits of diversity are similar to those of a 
law school as articulated in Grutter,” but the court also identified 
reasons why “public secondary schools have an equal if not more 
important role” in “‘preparing students for work and citizenship.’”151 
First, “underlying the history of desegregation in this country is a 
legal regime that recognizes the principle that public secondary 
education serves a unique and vital socialization function in our 
democratic society.”152 Second, “a substantial number of Seattle’s 
public high school graduates do not attend college. For these 
students, their public high school educational experience will be their 
sole opportunity to reap the benefits of a diverse learning 
environment.”153 And third, “the public school context involves 
students who, because they are younger and more impressionable, are 
more amenable to the benefits of diversity.”154 The court deemed all 
three “compelling educational and social benefits of [racial] diversity 
unique to the public secondary school context.”155 
Regarding the second cluster of interests asserted by the District, 
the Ninth Circuit noted the research indicating “that racially 
concentrated or isolated schools are characterized by much higher 
levels of poverty, lower average test scores, lower levels of student 
achievement, with less-qualified teachers and fewer advanced 
 
 149. Id. at 1174. 
 150. Id. at 1174–75. 
 151. Id. at 1175 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003)). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1176 (footnote omitted). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1177. 
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courses.”156 The court observed that “because of Seattle’s housing 
patterns, high schools in Seattle would be highly segregated absent 
race conscious measures.”157 It held the interest in reducing racial 
isolation “clearly compelling.”158 
2. Analysis.  In considering whether these courts are correct 
that voluntary integration plans advance one or more compelling 
interests, it is important to frame the proffered interests with some 
precision. One type of diversity interest may not be as compelling in 
the K–12 context as another. Regarding assignment plans, the alleged 
interests concern integration or racial diversity, not general diversity 
as in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz.159 
While Chief Judge Heyburn and the Ninth Circuit noted 
important similarities and differences between voluntary integration 
plans and affirmative action in higher education, the two courts 
overstated the similarities in some respects. Race-conscious 
assignment plans do not seek to secure viewpoint diversity to 
anywhere near the extent that universities do. Nor are such plans 
primarily concerned with maintaining a visibly open path to 
leadership.160 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit appeared at times to 
conflate the Grutter interest in general diversity with the public school 
interest in racial diversity.161 These problems notwithstanding, both 
courts properly concluded that voluntary integration plans advance 
compelling interests. 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 1178. 
 158. Id. at 1179. 
 159. Cf. generally Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057 (1990) (analyzing the problem of abstraction in 
constitutional law).   
 160. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 335 (“[T]o the extent that Grutter and Gratz also rely on 
viewpoint diversity, or on making sure that the ‘path to leadership’ is visibly open to all, those 
decisions do not answer the precise question raised by voluntary integration plans at the public 
school level.”). Yet universities may find it difficult to maintain a visibly open path to leadership 
in the face of severe racial isolation in primary and secondary education. See infra notes 202–08 
and accompanying text. 
 161. See, e.g., supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. This conflation is understandable 
in light of the Grutter Court’s arguable inconsistency. It stated that it was adopting Justice 
Powell’s general diversity rationale, but it in fact focused more specifically on racial diversity 
than Powell had. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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a. The Mission of Public Education.  The mission of public 
education in American society includes instilling cultural values,162 
and school districts have a compelling interest in enabling their 
schools to fulfill this mission. The Court has repeatedly stated that the 
institution of public education is very special in light of the civic, 
social, and educational functions it performs. The Court in Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser163 insisted that “‘inculcation’” of “the 
‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system’”164 is “truly the work of the schools.”165 The Court in 
Plyler v. Doe166 declared that “[w]e have recognized the public schools 
as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic 
system of government”;167 that “education provides the basic tools by 
which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the 
benefit of us all”; and that “education has a fundamental role in 
maintaining the fabric of our society.”168 The Court in Ambach v. 
Norwick169 proclaimed “[t]he importance of public schools in the 
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the 
preservation of the values on which our society rests.”170 
Almost all would agree that public schools are charged with 
educating students in the sense of empowering them to achieve 
academically (e.g., teaching the “three Rs”). When one turns to 
socialization, however, matters become more controversial. Although 
there is always disagreement about the values that public schools 
should be instilling, most would agree that they include (1) socializing 
students to the value of individualism in the sense that citizens should 
not be treated by government as members of racial groups, and (2) 
socializing them to the value that “[a]ll members” of our racially and 
ethnically “heterogeneous society”171 must learn to live together in 
 
 162. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 189 (1995) (observing that the “process of socialization . . . . most typically 
occurs through institutions like the family and the elementary school”); id. at 190 (noting the 
role of “the institution of coercive public education” in “instill[ing] [principles] in persons as 
part of their socialization into community values”). 
 163. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 164. Id. at 683, 681 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979)). 
 165. Id. at 683. 
 166. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 167. Id. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)). 
 168. Id. 
 169. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
 170. Id. at 76. 
 171. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
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peace and maybe even in harmony,172 so that “our society [can] 
continue to progress as a multiracial democracy.”173 These values can 
of course be in tension at times, but surely public schools can affirm 
them both. A critical issue is which value predominates in public 
education when they conflict. 
One possible answer is socialization to the value that an 
individual’s race or ethnicity is irrelevant in this country when 
government imposes private burdens in pursuit of public benefits, 
regardless of the degree and kind of these burdens and benefits and 
regardless of the context. American public education is hardly 
indifferent to the importance of valuing the unique qualities and 
aspirations of each person and not treating people simply as members 
of racial groups. As Justices Scalia and Thomas have expressed in 
their affirmative action opinions,174 individualism in this sense is a 
deeply embedded aspect of America’s collective commitments. In 
dissent in the Seattle case, Judge Bea drew powerfully from this 
cultural store: 
The District’s use of the racial tiebreaker to achieve racial balance in 
its high schools infringes upon each student’s right to equal 
protection and tramples upon the unique and valuable nature of 
each individual. We are not different because of our skin color; we 
are different because each one of us is unique. That uniqueness 
incorporates our opinions, our background, our religion (or lack 
thereof), our thought, and our color.175 
In Judge Bea’s view, “[t]he District’s stark racial classifications . . . 
offend intrinsic notions of individuality.”176 Because public schools are 
principal sites of cultural reproduction,177 teaching individualism in 
 
 172. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. FOR REVIEW OF THE MASTER PLAN FOR HIGHER EDUC., CAL. 
LEGISLATURE, CALIFORNIA FACES . . . CALIFORNIA’S FUTURE: EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP 
IN A MULTIRACIAL DEMOCRACY, at ii, 7 (1989) (describing an “educational system [that] 
liberates and sustains our capacity to live together” and “forge[s] a creative and productive 
society of mutual respect and accommodation”). 
 173. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991). 
 174. See, e.g., supra note 124. 
 175. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1221 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908). 
 176. Id. at 1205. 
 177. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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this sense has to be one facet of the function of public education in 
America.178 
It is nonetheless difficult to reconcile such a vigorously 
individualist understanding of the role of public education in America 
with the Court’s past interpretations of American culture. As already 
noted, when the Court has considered the institution of public 
education, it has focused consistently on the values of democracy, 
citizenship, and the public good. Public schools, the Court has 
declared, are “the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion 
among a heterogeneous democratic people.”179 The Court has 
repeatedly recognized the nation-building function of public 
education, authoring this declaration of interdependence in Brown: 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the 
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition 
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is 
required in the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very 
foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his 
environment.180 
The Brown Court, after “consider[ing] public education in the light of 
its full development and its present place in American life throughout 
the Nation,”181 was explicit that the primary role of public education 
in America is to advance the public good. 
 
 178. It was thus in a school case that the Court proclaimed: “If there is any fixed star in our 
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to 
confess by word or act their faith therein.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
642 (1943). 
 179. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216 (1948). 
 180. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 181. Id. at 492–93. 
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In all of these cases and elsewhere,182 the Court has made clear 
that the public good advanced by public education is not best 
understood in primarily individualistic terms; rather, it has declared 
that public schools socialize students to values of mutual 
understanding, social cooperation, and social unity.183 Judge Kozinski 
voiced a similar point in focusing explicitly on the value of racial 
harmony: 
[T]ime spent in school . . . has a significant impact on [a] student’s 
development. The school environment forces students both to 
compete and cooperate . . . . Schoolmates often become friends, 
rivals and romantic partners; learning to deal with individuals of 
different races in these various capacities cannot help but foster the 
live-and-let-live spirit that is the essence of the American 
experience. . . . Schools . . . don’t simply prepare students for further 
education . . . ; good schools prepare students for life, by instilling 
skills and attitudes that will serve them long after their first year of 
college.184 
 
 182. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (reaffirming 
“our historic dedication to public education”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) 
(“Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”); id. at 221 
(“[A]s . . . pointed out early in our history, . . . some degree of education is necessary to prepare 
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to 
preserve freedom and independence.”); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 
230 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing “the public schools as a most vital civic 
institution for the preservation of a democratic system of government”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (“The American people have always regarded education and [the] 
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.”). 
 183. Public schools are the primary institutions in America that instill such values across 
racial and ethnic lines. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 181 (reporting that between 1976 
and 2000, “[s]chools represented the most important source of contact for these [black and 
white] young people. Two-thirds of blacks and more than one-third of whites said they had 
gotten to know people of other races a lot in school. Next most important as venues for this 
contact were employment, sports teams, and clubs, in that order.”); id. at 188 (“In light of the 
high degree of residential segregation that characterizes most urban areas of the country, 
schools are for most children the first opportunity to have significant contact with individuals of 
other racial and ethnic groups.”). It is thus difficult to characterize the benefits alleged to be 
associated with integrated schools as “a lesson of life,” not a lesson learned at school. Cf. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“For it is a lesson of life rather than law—essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather 
learned by, for it cannot be ‘taught’ in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and 20 years 
younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions 
ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.” (emphasis added)). 
 184. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1195 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 
2006) (No. 05-908). In considering the import of Judge Kozinski’s reference to “romantic 
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Chief Judge Heyburn deemed such lessons “pretty important for 
most people who are fortunate enough to learn them early in life.”185 
These judicial interpretations are supported by any faithful 
rendition of the history of American educational ideals. John Dewey 
emphasized cooperative learning and engagement in his educational 
philosophy. He began with the observation that “our chief business 
with [the young] is to enable them to share in a common life.”186 
Alexander Bickel wrote in analyzing Brown that “the public 
school . . . fails in its mission if it teaches the races separately.”187 He 
characterized this mission as “equalizing, socializing, nationalizing—
assimilationist and secular,” and he traced “[t]he implication that the 
public schools are charged with” this mission to “the history of public 
education in the United States—or at least [to] the history of what 
men have thought about public education in the United States.”188 
Bickel cogently captured “[t]he full-blown conception of the public 
school as a secular, nationalizing, assimilationist agent,” which “dates 
more or less to the post-Civil War years of the great immigrations.”189 
Amy Gutmann, to note one more example, argues that de facto 
segregated schools should be integrated even when the majority 
 
partners,” one might bear in mind the reasons for the Court’s controversial disposition of Naim 
v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (dismissing for want of a substantial federal question a challenge to 
a Virginia antimiscegenation statute despite its incompatibility with the equal protection 
principles articulated in Brown). See Siegel, supra note 88, at 2017 (“Naim . . . . constituted a 
rare accommodation that principle made with pragmatism for the ultimate purpose of 
vindicating Brown’s promise. Principle lost the battle for a few more years, a significant—and 
perhaps intolerable—cost, but at least principle put itself in a position not to lose the war.” 
(footnotes omitted)). When the legitimacy of Brown was more secure, the Court unanimously 
invalidated the Virginia law. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 185. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 853 n.35 (W.D. Ky. 
2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County 
Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). These statements resonate with the 
admonition that “unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people 
will ever learn to live together.” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 186. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 8 (1916); see id. at 1 (“While the living 
thing may easily be crushed by superior force, it none the less tries to turn the energies which 
act upon it into means of its own further existence. If it cannot do so, it does not just split into 
smaller pieces . . . but loses its identity as a living thing.”). 
 187. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 120–21 
(1970). 
 188. Id. at 121. 
 189. Id. See POST, supra note 162, at 183 (noting the function of “authoritative cultural 
institutions, like state educational systems, . . . to articulate the norms that reciprocally define 
individual and social identity and inculcate these norms in a manner than spans social 
divisions”). 
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opposes integration. She regards de facto segregation as 
“unacceptable by democratic principles even if it is often supported 
by democratic politics.”190 She so concludes “for reasons that return us 
to the main purpose of primary schooling: educating democratic 
citizens.”191 The moral component of this education, Gutmann argues, 
requires continuing efforts by government to reduce enduring racial 
prejudice.192 It seems, therefore, that American public schools are 
concerned less centrally with individualism and colorblindness and 
more centrally with socializing students to values of racial and ethnic 
harmony.193 
Even if one disagrees about how these cultural commitments 
trade off, the values of federalism suggest that school districts should 
be afforded leeway to work out the relation between them.194 The 
Court has instructed that “[n]o single tradition in public education is 
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; 
local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the 
maintenance of community concern and support for public schools 
and to quality of the educational process.”195 Justice Kennedy in 
particular has noted the “well established” understanding “that 
education is a traditional concern of the States,” and he has submitted 
that “the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed” when 
“considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish [a] 
 
 190. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 162 (1987). 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 752 (2004) (“In 
some sense, the question [whether the Constitution permits voluntary race-conscious student 
assignment to achieve diversity in public schools] should hardly seem vexing at all. The goal of 
creating racially integrated learning environments resonates deeply with our ideal of the 
common school and its mission of educating students for citizenship in a multiracial society. This 
goal has particular importance given our historical experience with racial segregation.”). 
 194. For discussions of the values that federalism is commonly thought to serve, see 
generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION 56–59 (2005); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Neil S. 
Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629 
(2006); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The 
Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341. For an overview of the 
normative federalism debate in constitutional law and citations to the literature, see ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109–12 (2d ed. 2005). 
 195. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974). 
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goal.”196 This is because “the States may perform their role as 
laboratories for experimentation to devise various solutions where 
the best solution is far from clear.”197 In the context of voluntary 
integration plans, where core and conflicting American ideals are 
implicated, federalism values counsel judicial respect for the way in 
which a school district prioritizes them.198 
b. Whether Integration Advances the Mission.  Even if school 
districts have a compelling interest in fulfilling their mission, and even 
if this mission, properly conceived, is more centrally concerned with 
teaching cross-racial unity than with instilling colorblindness, it does 
not necessarily follow that integrated schools actually advance this 
mission. It is therefore important to consider the constitutional 
significance of whether integrated schools do in fact produce civic, 
social, and educational benefits.199 
There is disagreement about whether racially diverse public 
schools advance academic achievement among all students.200 It is 
extremely difficult to establish causation in this context: isolating the 
independent impact of each causal variable is a formidable challenge, 
and there is no one phenomenon known as a racially integrated 
 
 196. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580–81 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 
Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741–42). 
 197. Id. at 581. 
 198. This is not an argument for deference to local control regardless of context. Rather, 
deference is warranted when core and conflicting American educational ideals are at stake. 
Racial segregation, which apparently still has its proponents, is not such an ideal. See Sam 
Dillon, Law to Segregate Omaha Schools Divides Nebraska, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, at A9. 
 199. For a careful review of the literature examining the impact of interracial contact on 
academic achievement, self-esteem, intergroup relations, and long-term educational attainment 
and employment, see CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 186–96. 
 200. Compare Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School 
Desegregation, Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 12–20, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908; 
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006), and Brief of the 
American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9–
13, Parents Involved and Meredith, with Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom & 
Stephan Thernstrom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12–21, Parents Involved and 
Meredith, and Brief of Drs. Murphy, Rossell & Walberg as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 8–13, Parents Involved, and David J. Armor, The End of School Desegregation 
and the Achievement Gap, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 629, 653 (2001). Studies that have sought 
to determine the effect of desegregation on student achievement “have come up with a 
decidedly mixed set of results. In general, the research suggests no effect on mathematics 
achievement for blacks and some modest positive effect on reading for blacks. The achievement 
of whites does not appear to be harmed.” CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 187. 
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school.201 Because the degree and kind of interracial contact in 
American public schools vary tremendously even among racially 
diverse schools, it is unsurprising that the evidence on academic 
achievement is conflicting. 
What has been empirically demonstrated, however, is that 
racially isolated schools—specifically, public schools with high black 
or Latino concentration—offer inferior educational opportunities.202 
Congress has rendered this judgment.203 And in its briefs attacking the 
plans before the Court, even the United States labels the interest in 
avoiding minority student isolation “unquestioned”204 and 
“undoubtedly legitimate and important.”205 This problem exists not 
simply because racially isolated schools are more likely to be high-
poverty schools, but because teacher quality is sensitive to racial 
composition independent of other factors that affect teacher quality, 
 
 201. For an accessible discussion of some of the analytic difficulties, including omitted 
variable bias and the enormous diversity of experiences signified by the terms “desegregation” 
and “interracial contact,” see CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 194–96. See also McFarland v. 
Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 853 (W.D. Ky. 2004), aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th 
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 
2006) (No. 05-915) (“The Court cannot be certain to what extent the policy of an integrated 
school system has contributed to these [academic] successes.”). 
 202. See Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation, 
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra 
note 200, at 28–40. 
 203. In the Magnet Schools Assistance Act, Congress stressed the importance of voluntary 
efforts to secure the benefits of integrated schools and to reduce minority student isolation: 
It is in the best interests of the United States— 
(A) to continue the Federal Government’s support of . . . local educational agencies 
that are voluntarily seeking to foster meaningful interaction among students of 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds, beginning at the earliest stage of such 
students’ education; 
. . . 
(C) to continue to desegregate and diversify schools by supporting magnet 
schools . . . . 
20 U.S.C. § 7231(a)(4) (Supp. III 2003). Congress stated that “[t]he purpose of this part is to 
assist in the desegregation of schools served by local educational agencies by providing financial 
assistance to eligible local educational agencies for,” among other things, “the elimination, 
reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation in elementary schools and secondary 
schools with substantial proportions of minority students, which shall include assisting in the 
efforts of the United States to achieve voluntary desegregation in public schools.” Id. 
§ 7231(b)(1). 
 204. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 131, at 
7. 
 205. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 17, at 
15. 
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including school poverty.206 Specifically, “[w]hite teachers—who 
comprise 85% of the teaching force—often transfer to schools with a 
lower minority percentage.”207 Research shows that recognition of a 
compelling interest in reducing racial isolation in public schools is not 
premised on unconstitutional stereotypes and assertions of inherent 
racial inferiority.208 Rather, the interest is based on the empirically 
demonstrated reality that racially isolated schools afford inferior 
educational opportunities in substantial part because experienced 
white teachers decline to work in such schools for extended periods of 
time. 
Turning to the civic and social benefits alleged to be associated 
with integrated schools, one might be inclined to think that a rigorous 
empirical demonstration of benefits is unnecessary. It seems 
intuitively plausible that a promising way to combat racial and ethnic 
prejudice, stereotyping, and polarization is to have children of 
different races and ethnicities spend productive time together at 
school. Putting aside for the moment whether it is a lesson of social 
science,209 it is a widely-shared lesson of life that time well spent with 
people of different races and ethnicities helps to ameliorate the 
ignorance and fear that fuel racialized and ethnocentric thinking. 
There would seem to be much wisdom in Judge Kozinski’s words to 
this effect: 
It is difficult to deny the importance of teaching children, during 
their formative years, how to deal respectfully and collegially with 
peers of different races. Whether one would call this a compelling 
 
 206. See Brief of 19 Former Chancellors of the University of California as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 3, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-
908; Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (“[P]ublic 
schools with high black or Latino concentration have serious difficulty attracting and retaining 
high-quality teachers, and this problem is directly related to the racial make-up of schools 
independent of other factors such as teacher salaries, school poverty, or student achievement.”). 
Cf. Sam Dillon, Schools Slow in Closing Gaps Between Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at A1 
(reporting the conclusions of experts and recent reports that poor teacher quality in racially 
isolated schools is a principal cause of the persistent achievement gap between the races). 
 207. Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation, 
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra 
note 200, at 31. 
 208. Cf. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he court 
has read our cases to support the theory that black students suffer an unspecified psychological 
harm from segregation that retards their mental and educational development. This approach 
not only relies upon questionable social science research rather than constitutional principle, 
but it also rests on an assumption of black inferiority.”). 
 209. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text. 
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interest or merely a highly rational one strikes me as little more than 
semantics. The reality is that attitudes and patterns of interaction 
are developed early in life and, in a multicultural and diverse society 
such as ours, there is great value in developing the ability to interact 
successfully with individuals who are very different from oneself. It 
is important for the individual student, to be sure, but it is also 
vitally important for us as a society.210 
This view seems more substantial than “a faddish slogan of the 
cognoscenti.”211 As Judge Bea wrote in dissent in the Seattle case, 
“[t]he idea that children will gain social, civic, and perhaps 
educational skills by attending schools with a proportion of students 
of other ethnicities and races, which proportion reflects the world in 
which they will move, is a notion grounded in common sense.”212 
One might think it plausible to believe that racially integrated 
schools confer important civic and social advantages, but still insist 
that the alleged benefits are unproven. Although the virtues of 
intergroup contact in public schools are evident to many educators 
and citizens, and while hundreds of social scientists have concluded 
that “racially integrated schools tend to provide benefits that are not 
available in segregated schools,”213 these claims are in fact disputed.214 
 
 210. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 
2006) (No. 05-908). 
 211. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 212. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1196 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 213. Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation, 
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra 
note 200, at 2. The civic and social benefits identified by social scientists include not only 
academic achievement and cross-racial understanding, but also better life opportunities, 
preparation for a diverse workforce, reduced residential segregation, and greater parental 
involvement in schools. See id. at 2–28; Brief of 19 Former Chancellors of the University of 
California as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra note 206, at 7–10; Brief of the 
American Educational Research Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
supra note 200, at 5–9, 14–17; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 
296–307 (1999) (identifying various benefits of racial and socioeconomic integration). 
 214. See, e.g., Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 200, at 21–29; Brief of Drs. Murphy, Rossell & 
Walberg as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 200, at 13–14; David J. Armor & 
Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in BEYOND THE 
COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 252 (Abigail 
Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom eds., 2002). For a critique of the theory and empirics 
associated with the “contact hypothesis” in the social sciences, see H.D. FORBES, ETHNIC 
CONFLICT: COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS 42–141 (1997). 
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Some of the above statements are tautological: suggesting that 
“productive” time and time “well spent” at school with persons of 
other races and ethnicities will improve intergroup relations assumes 
the conclusion that the time will be productive and well spent. 
Whether the civic and social benefits alleged to be associated with 
integration are in fact realized depends on what actually happens 
when children of different races and ethnicities attend school 
together, and the results can vary widely depending on the 
circumstances of the interaction.215 
The key legal question is what the Court should do in light of the 
empirical uncertainty that is unavoidable given the complexity of the 
world, the current state of knowledge, and the inherent limits of 
social science.216 One option is to wield the Constitution to end local 
democratic experimentation in search of workable solutions to 
difficult problems. A more sensible approach is constitutionally to 
cabin the kinds of experiments that school boards may conduct, but 
nonetheless to allow them real room to take place—hopefully, with 
care and caution and informed by social scientific knowledge of how 
 
After reviewing the research on “the great social experiment of desegregation” in 
America, Forbes writes that “if any simple conclusion can be drawn from more than a 
generation of social science research on the attitudinal effects of desegregation, it is that no 
simple conclusion about its effects is possible.” Id. at 61. Forbes describes the methodological 
obstacles that impede empirical research: observing developments over a relatively long period 
of time; securing the cooperation of a random sample of school officials, parents, and students; 
using valid measures of racial attitudes; avoiding the contamination of attitude measures by 
“history”; and avoiding the contamination of children’s responses by the opinions of parents and 
teachers. Id. at 51. Yet Forbes distinguishes “short-term effects on attitudes,” which are “the 
most important effects . . . [f]or testing the contact hypothesis,” from “longer-term effects, both 
direct (for example, the effects of attending a desegregated school on the probability of 
attending college or living in an integrated neighborhood) and indirect (the effect of the policy 
itself on social norms and expectations),” which “must also be taken into account” in 
“evaluating the policy of desegregation.” Id. at 56. Forbes favorably quotes research 
documenting the “‘revolution in intergroup relations . . . since World War II.’” Id. at 56–57 
(citation omitted). 
 215. See Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation, 
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra 
note 200, at 2 (“Racially desegregated schools are not an educational or social panacea and the 
extent of benefits will depend on how desegregation is structured and implemented.”); 
CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 189 (“In schools using teams and emphasizing cooperative 
work, for example, cross-race friendships are more common.”); id. at 190–91 (“Whites tend to 
have more positive attitudes toward minority students when they associate with them on an 
equal basis, and their views are more negative in situations where minority students have low 
academic performance.”). 
 216. See supra notes 201, 214 and accompanying text. 
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best to structure integrated environments—so long as local 
constituencies continue to approve them. 
If, as in Grutter,217 the Court is prepared to defer to a reasonable 
educational judgment of the JCPS and the Seattle School Board on 
the question of causation, then this issue will not doom the plans. 
There is a reasonable basis in evidence for the educational judgments 
of the school officials,218 even if some social scientists disagree.219 
Moreover, even if the Court were to repudiate Grutter’s deference to 
state decisions regarding the admissions policies of its universities, 
federalism values counsel judicial respect for the reasonable 
judgments of locally elected school boards that integrated schools 
secure the proffered benefits.220 
c. A Constitutive Compelling Interest.  It is particularly 
appropriate for the federal courts not to eviscerate local autonomy in 
the context of race-conscious assignment plans. This is because 
ongoing voluntary efforts by school districts to integrate the nation’s 
public schools are genuinely and primarily aimed at the social 
 
 217. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to which we defer. The 
Law School’s assessment that diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by 
respondents and their amici.”). The Grutter Court also deferred on the issue of substantiation by 
declining seriously to engage the empirical debate. 
 218. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 220. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1174 
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result) (“Not only does a plan that 
promotes the mixing of races deserve support rather than suspicion and hostility from the 
judiciary, but there is much to be said for returning primacy on matters of educational policy to 
local officials.”), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); id. at 1196 (“When it 
comes to a plan such as this—a plan that gives the American melting pot a healthy stir without 
benefiting or burdening any particular group—I would leave the decision to those much closer 
to the affected community, who have the power to reverse or modify the policy should it prove 
unworkable.”); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., 
concurring) (“[O]ne of the advantages of our federal regime is that different communities try 
different solutions to common problems and gravitate toward those that prove most successful 
or seem to them best to suit their individual needs.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005); id. at 29 
(“The problems that the Lynn plan addresses are real, and time is more likely than court 
hearings to tell us whether the solution is a good one . . . .”); see also supra note 96 (quoting a 
Powell opinion in a desegregation case); Liu, supra note 193, at 758–59 (“[A]fter several 
decades in which the Court has repeatedly invoked local control to limit school desegregation, it 
would be ironic, to say the least, if the Court now closed the door on locally driven efforts to 
achieve racially integrated schools.”). 
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transformation of race in America.221 The very telos of assignment 
plans that pursue racial integration is to reduce balkanization by 
teaching impressionable young Americans of all races and ethnicities 
to learn and to work together as one people. 
Indeed, this discussion reveals a compelling interest advanced by 
voluntary integration plans that does not turn on matters of empirical 
causation. Regardless of whether it can be proven empirically that the 
alleged benefits of education in an integrated setting materialize to a 
significant extent, a compelling interest exists in having school districts 
affirm the value of education in an integrated setting. In other words, 
school boards advance a compelling interest when they express a 
message of integration—the message that Americans constitute one 
people who learn and work together, not apart, and that government 
should afford all students the same public educational opportunities 
without racial separation. It is for this reason that young people 
assigned to public schools pursuant to voluntary integration plans are 
appropriately regarded as the twenty-first century children of Brown 
v. Board of Education.222 The cases before the Court do not involve 
remedies for de jure segregation, but they are very much about the 
American moral ideal of integration that Brown has come to 
symbolize.223 Not only does respect for local autonomy support the 
 
 221. There can be little doubt that the Court’s post-Brown equal protection jurisprudence 
was suffused with concern to encourage the social transformation of race in America. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1963) (“But by placing a racial label on a candidate at 
the most crucial stage in the electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast—the State 
furnishes a vehicle by which racial prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group 
because of race and for another.”). 
 222. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Accord McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 
834, 851 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (“Viewing voluntary school integration as an extension of the 
Supreme Court’s school desegregation jurisprudence makes sense. In 1975, an integrated school 
system and all the benefits it promised were thought so essential that various federal courts 
required JCPS to create and maintain it. . . . It would seem rather odd that the concepts of equal 
protection, local control and limited deference are now only one-way streets to a particular 
educational policy, virtually prohibiting the voluntary continuation of policies once required by 
law.”). 
 223. Regardless of whether Brown as originally understood was primarily about integration 
or the end of state-mandated segregation, Brown has come to embody American ideals that 
transcend the Court’s holding: 
Integrated schools, better academic performance, appreciation for our diverse 
heritage and stronger, more competitive public schools are consistent with central 
values and themes of American culture. Access to equal and integrated schools has 
been an important national ethic ever since Brown v. Board of Education established 
what Richard Kluger described as “nothing short of a reconsecration of American 
ideals.” What Kluger and others have articulated is that Brown’s symbolic, moral and 
now historic significance may now far exceed its strictly legal importance. . . . Brown’s 
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authority of school officials to express a message of integration, but 
the interest advanced by such expression is compelling precisely 
because the message engages the concern with balkanization that has 
animated the Court’s decisions in every setting canvassed in Part II.224 
A key advantage of conceptualizing the compelling interest this 
way is that it helps the interpretive community to focus on what is 
primarily at stake in the constitutional debate over voluntary 
integration plans. The controversy is first and foremost not 
instrumental in nature, but constitutive. The central disagreement 
concerns not whether a proposed policy will in fact achieve a set of 
goals, but rather which elements of American collective identity 
should prevail in an instance of genuine value conflict. Defenders of 
the plans view integration as the enduring moral legacy of Brown, and 
they conceive living together across racial and ethnic lines as essential 
if America is ever going to be the kind of society that it strives to be. 
Many critics of the plans view colorblindness—or, at a minimum, a 
 
original moral and constitutional declaration has survived to become a mainstream 
value of American education and . . . the [School] Board’s interests are entirely 
consistent with these traditional American values. They reinforce our intuitive sense 
that education is about a lot more than just the “three-R’s.” 
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (quoting KLUGER, supra note 117, at 710). See Ryan, supra 
note 5, at 336–37 (“[R]acially integrated schools carry forward what might be called the moral 
ideal of Brown, namely that schools should not simply be desegregated but also integrated.”). 
This moral ideal embodies the post-Brown judgment of “courts and federal officials, not to 
mention a large segment of the public” and now communities around the nation “that black and 
white [and Latino and Asian American] children should actually go to school together.” Id. at 
336. 
 224. To be clear, the interests include both the benefits of education in an integrated setting 
and affirmance of the value of an integrated setting. But they have different legal logics and 
only the former can be falsified empirically. 
In light of these interests (and the interest in reducing racial isolation), it would be 
inappropriate to conclude that the school districts are “engaged in simple race balancing,” 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1197 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting). Race balancing as an end in itself is “patently unconstitutional.” 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) 
(“Racial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“Preferring members of any one group for no 
reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.”). But the interests 
discussed here are not properly described as balancing “for its own sake.” See Comfort v. Lynn 
Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Where a community does not seek racial diversity 
for its own sake, but rather to advance a compelling interest in the educational benefits that 
diversity provides, there is no absolute bar to pursuing racial diversity.”). It would therefore also 
not be fair to say that the districts seek a racial “aesthetic.” Contra Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 n.3 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I refer to the Law School’s interest as 
an ‘aesthetic.’ That is, the Law School wants to have a certain appearance, from the shape of the 
desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students sitting at them.”). 
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repudiation of racial classifications—as both the true legacy of Brown 
and the embodiment of the sort of society that the nation should want 
to be on matters of race regardless of who associates with whom. 
Neither side is likely to be persuaded by contrary empirical evidence, 
at least as long as the evidence remains open to reasonable 
disagreement.225 Nor is the Court likely to decide the cases before it 
based on empirics. Each side makes claims not merely on the 
Constitution as hard law, but on the Constitution as the embodiment 
of our “fundamental nature as a people,” which “is sacred and 
demands our respectful acknowledgement.”226 Each side embraces 
hallowed national ideals. And each of these ideals was “purchased at 
the price of immeasurable human suffering.”227 
If the Court concludes that a compelling interest supports the 
plans before it,228 then the decisive issue becomes narrow tailoring. As 
part of its inquiry, the Court will likely consider whether some kind of 
individualized consideration is required in the assignment context.229 
In answering this question, the probable effect on balkanization is 
key.230 
 
 225. Much of the evidence will remain disputed due to the various methodological 
challenges. See supra notes 201, 214 and accompanying text (discussing some of the difficulties). 
The point is not that conceptions of identity are necessarily indifferent to empirical truth, but 
that constitutive claims will predominate when the empirics cannot provide decisive guidance. 
 226. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987). 
 227. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). The empirical debate over the various potential benefits 
and harms of integrated schools echoes in some ways the debate over the Court’s use of social 
science evidence in Brown. See Siegel, supra note 134, at 1480–89. 
 228. An alternative would be for the Court to adopt Judge Kozinski’s recommendation to 
apply “robust and realistic rational basis review.” Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, 
J., concurring in the result). This seems unlikely, however, in light of all the case law holding 
that racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny. For a recent pronouncement, see Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005). 
 229. The Court could avoid addressing the applicability of an individualized consideration 
requirement by holding that the plans at issue are not narrowly tailored for some other reason. 
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (flagging the other requirements). It seems 
unlikely, however, that the Court would decline to discuss the issue of individualized 
consideration when it was decisive in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz and the lower federal courts are 
divided over it. 
 230. I do not analyze separately most of the other narrow tailoring factors, including 
whether schools can achieve the compelling interests I have identified without using race 
explicitly. It is noteworthy, however, that the distinction between the benefits of integration and 
affirmance of integration may be important in considering the issue of race-neutral alternatives. 
Proxy variables like geography or socioeconomic status may achieve some measure of 
integration under some circumstances—because they are not in fact race neutral when the 
purpose of using them is to achieve racial integration. But such proxies are less likely than the 
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B. Individualized Consideration 
1. Deriving the Standard.  If one or more compelling interests 
supports voluntary integration plans, where, if anywhere, should such 
plans be situated along the balkanization continuum set forth at the 
end of Part II? Should the Court view the robust and explicit use of 
race as compatible with the legal requirements of individualized 
consideration, or should it analogize to Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz by 
requiring school districts not to overuse race, in part by rendering 
such use opaque? Should the Justices deploy the individualized 
consideration requirement to prohibit school boards from using race 
at all, or should the Court reject all of these options and fashion a 
different individualized consideration requirement for this different 
setting? 
The proper resolution of these questions turns not on a 
mechanical application of controlling precedent. Race-conscious 
assignment plans are unlike racial discrimination laws of the past, 
which subordinated racial minorities. And for reasons I will explore 
in detail, they are unlike laws of the present that impose burdens on 
members of one race in order to benefit members of another.231 
Rather, the appropriate resolution rests on either a sweeping 
constitutional judgment about racial questions generally in America, 
or a contextual judgment about the likely effect of voluntary 
integration plans on racial balkanization in American society. 
For the reasons offered in Part II, it is difficult to argue that a 
global judgment about race should determine the kind of 
individualized consideration requirement that is appropriate in this 
setting. The Court does not render such judgments. Instead, it has 
made clear in Grutter and elsewhere that “[c]ontext matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal 
Protection Clause”; that “[n]ot every decision influenced by race is 
 
explicit use of race to advance the cause of having government expressively endorse the value of 
integration. Affirming the value of integrated schools requires public recognition of the reality 
of race. Colorblindness discourse wars with the American moral ideal of racial integration. 
 231. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1193 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result) 
(“But there is something unreal about . . . efforts to apply the teachings of prior Supreme Court 
cases, all decided in very different contexts, to the plan at issue here. I hear the thud of square 
pegs being pounded into round holes.”); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 27 (1st Cir. 
2005) (Boudin, J., concurring) (“[The plan] is not, like old-fashioned racial discrimination laws, 
aimed at oppressing blacks; nor, like modern affirmative action, does it seek to give one racial 
group an edge over another. . . . [T]he plan does not segregate persons by race. Nor does it 
involve racial quotas.” (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). 
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equally objectionable”; and that “strict scrutiny is designed to provide 
a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity 
of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the 
use of race in that particular context.”232 
If the kind of individualized consideration requirement 
appropriate in this setting does not follow from a general judgment 
about race, then the Court must render a contextual judgment about 
the net expected effect of using racial criteria on racial balkanization. 
This judgment, in turn, requires the Court to consider not only the 
social benefits of integrated schools discussed in Part III.A, but also 
the relevance of merit, the symbolic message, and the individual 
burdens in this setting. As Part II demonstrated, these considerations 
are at least as relevant to the tailoring inquiry as they are to the 
interest analysis. This is because the narrow tailoring inquiry imposes 
substantive limits that often have little to do with ensuring fit and 
much to do with reducing balkanization. 
It is instructive in this regard to compare the potential for 
balkanization in the context of affirmative action in higher education 
with the potential for balkanization in the context of race-conscious 
student assignments.233 The universe of potential social threats that 
 
 232. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995) (“[S]trict scrutiny does take ‘relevant differences’ into account—
indeed, that is its fundamental purpose.”); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343–44 (1960) 
(“[I]n dealing with claims under broad provisions of the Constitution, which derive content by 
an interpretive process of inclusion and exclusion, it is imperative that generalizations, based on 
and qualified by the concrete situations that gave rise to them, must not be applied out of 
context in disregard of variant controlling facts.”). 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, by contrast, do tend to make global judgments about racial 
questions. See, e.g., supra note 124 and accompanying text. Would they object to a policy that 
took race into account in dividing students up within a public school? Imagine that a random 
draw resulted in six African American children and two white children being assigned to one 
first-grade class, while the other first-grade class was all white. Would it be constitutionally 
problematic to reshuffle the children so that each class would consist of five white children and 
three African American children, and to do this for all the reasons that Jefferson County and 
Seattle take race into account? If Justices Scalia and Thomas would conceive the reshuffling as 
unconstitutional, then their views would seem out of touch with how most people would likely 
regard the situation because they would think the potential harm miniscule. If Justices Scalia 
and Thomas would perceive no constitutional infirmity, then they do not really mean what they 
say about the inherently invidious nature of racial classifications regardless of context. 
 233. The analysis here actually requires several comparisons: (1) between K–12 education 
and higher education; (2) between achieving the compelling interests identified in Part III.A 
without using race and achieving them by using race; and (3) between the effects of using race 
explicitly and the effects of using race implicitly. I leave the second question to others. But see 
supra note 230. I merely note that in general, there are good reasons for skepticism that school 
districts can achieve similar levels of racial integration without using racial criteria to some 
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the Court was seeking to head off in Bakke (via Justice Powell), 
Grutter, and Gratz are familiar now, but the high level of abstraction 
at which these threats are frequently described conflates important 
distinctions.234 I categorize the potential dangers of concern to the 
Court as follows: (1) the social stigmatization of minority students as 
incapable of succeeding without the intervention of government on 
their behalf; (2) the associated internalization of a sense of 
unworthiness by minority students; (3) the internalization of a sense 
of entitlement to preferences by minority students; (4) the 
stereotypical assumption that all members of a racial group think the 
same way; (5) hostility generated in whites caused by their reaction to 
being judged unworthy of admission potentially because of the 
existence of the program; (6) hostility in whites caused by their 
reaction to not getting what they want (i.e., admission) potentially 
because of the existence of the program; and (7) cross-racial tension 
caused by the very act of distributing benefits and burdens in part 
based on race. 
Viewed in light of these considerations, the school assignment 
context is very different from affirmative action in university 
admissions. To begin with, conventional understandings of merit are 
not at stake in the assignment process; an applicant’s various abilities 
are given no weight in determining placements.235 Notions of student 
entitlement and desert thus have no applicability, and the concerns 
they can raise do not impede the efforts of government to improve 
race relations by taking race into account, whether explicitly or 
implicitly. Accordingly, considerations one, two, and five pose no 
 
extent. See Statement of American Social Scientists of Research on School Desegregation, 
Appendix to Brief of 553 Social Scientists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra 
note 200, at 41–54. I discuss the third comparison at the end of this section.  
 234. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (plurality 
opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. 
Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 
438 U. S., at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.) (“[P]referential programs may only reinforce common 
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection 
based on a factor having no relation to individual worth.”)). In Grutter, Justice O’Connor 
reproduced the above quote from Croson in rejecting the apparent implication that racial 
classifications must be “strictly reserved for remedial settings.” See 539 U.S. at 328. 
 235. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1181 
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Students’ relative qualifications are irrelevant . . . .”), cert. granted, 
126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908). 
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reasonable risk of balkanization.236 When school officials administer 
the Seattle plan, for example, assignments are certainly competitive in 
the sense that race comes into play only when demand exceeds supply 
at a particular school. Judge Bea made much of this fact in his 
dissent.237 But this argument conceptualizes the phenomenon of 
competition at too high a level of generality.238 In Seattle, as in 
Jefferson County, assignments are not competitive in the evaluative 
sense. Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz are thus inapt in this regard. So are 
Croson and Adarand. 
In addition, the assignment prospects of members of all races are 
generally helped or hurt to roughly the same extent, so that the third 
factor raises no concerns.239 In light of the nature of the public school 
educational process, moreover, a school district’s interests do not 
include securing viewpoint diversity in the classroom as part of the 
“robust exchange of ideas,”240 so that the fourth concern is less 
significantly implicated than in the university setting. The only 
potentially strong threats to social acceptance of the use of race, 
therefore, arise from the sixth and seventh considerations, although in 
 
 236. This difference between affirmative action in higher education and race-conscious 
student assignments is quite significant. It makes no sense to assert that one has “earned” a 
coveted assignment. Whatever one thinks of university admissions, in the assignment context no 
student has earned anything. That said, some parents may feel entitled to send their children to 
highly coveted local schools on the ground that they “paid their way in” to the wealthy 
neighborhoods surrounding the schools. 
 237. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1211–12 (Bea, J., dissenting) (“The District insulates 
applicants belonging to certain racial groups from competition for admission to those schools 
perceived to be of higher quality.”). 
 238. Cf. generally Tribe & Dorf, supra note 159 (analyzing levels of generality in the 
definition of fundamental rights). Competition for scarce assignments may nonetheless increase 
balkanization. This concern is covered by the sixth and seventh factors discussed in the text. 
 239. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1170 (stating that “[t]he race-based tiebreaker is 
applied to both white and nonwhite students” and providing the relevant data for a particular 
school year). One might respond that the Court rejected the notion of equally shared burdens 
based on race in Plessy and Loving. But to so respond is to erase collective memory. There was 
nothing equal about the burdens imposed by a regime of racial apartheid that mandated racial 
separation in order to subordinate African Americans. One cannot plausibly suggest that the 
assignment cases before the Court have anything to do with the maintenance of a caste system 
or the practice of racial subordination. Johnson v. California is less off point, see supra note 108, 
but it too involved racial segregation, the opposite of what voluntary integration plans aim to 
produce. 
 240. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1182 (“[V]iewpoint diversity in the law school 
and high school contexts serves different albeit overlapping ends. In the law school setting, 
viewpoint diversity fosters the ‘robust exchange of ideas.’ In the high school context, viewpoint 
diversity fosters racial and civic understanding.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 324 
(2003) (citations omitted))). 
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the assignment context even these concerns seem less acute to the 
extent that the burdens imposed on individual students and families 
are not great.241 This is because any resulting social hostility is 
distributed across members of all races when they do not receive the 
assignments that they desire. Compared with affirmative action in 
higher education, therefore, responsibly crafted voluntary integration 
plans are more likely to send a message of integration and less likely 
to increase balkanization.242 This message, to reiterate,243 is that 
Americans of every race and ethnicity constitute one people who 
learn and work together, not apart, and that they deserve the same 
public educational opportunities without racial separation.244 
The differences between affirmative action in higher education 
and voluntary integration plans suggest that the sort of “[p]referment 
by race” employed by such plans is very unlikely to prove “the most 
divisive of all policies, containing within it the potential to destroy 
confidence in the Constitution and in the idea of equality.”245 At least 
when school districts limit both the use of race and the burdens 
imposed, voluntary integration plans do not run a reasonable risk of 
“perpetuat[ing] the hostilities that proper consideration of race is 
designed to avoid.”246 Rather, such plans likely prove “effective in 
bringing about the harmony and mutual respect among all citizens 
that our constitutional tradition has always sought.”247 
One might object that even the limited use of race in student 
assignment creates the wrong kind of politics; the message it sends 
 
 241. See infra notes 276–86 and accompanying text (analyzing the issue of individual 
burdens). 
 242. Cf. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he FCC policy seems based on the demeaning notion that members of the defined racial 
groups ascribe to certain ‘minority views’ that must be different from those of other citizens. 
Special preferences also can foster the view that members of the favored groups are inherently 
less able to compete on their own.”). 
 243. See supra text following note 221. 
 244. Of course, whether children actually receive this message depends in part on how 
parents explain the school district’s use of race to their children. Those who believe that any use 
of race by government sends the wrong message will probably not stress the virtues of 
integration to their children. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners at 2, Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-
908; Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (“The wrong 
message is being sent to our children: A child’s race is more important than equal protection of 
the laws, and the racial makeup of a student’s school determines his or her academic success.”). 
 245. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 246. Id. at 394. “The perpetuation, of course, would be the worst of all outcomes.” Id. 
 247. Id. at 394–95. 
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constitutes an incremental stop on the way to deeming race significant 
in every aspect of American life. This assertion strives toward an 
important point, but in so striving it overstates its case. Race-
conscious state action can send a message that increases 
balkanization, but then so can the refusal of government to act. There 
is nothing necessarily wholesome about the status quo.248 Indeed, the 
status quo is disturbing: America is a country many of whose public 
schools are becoming more and more segregated each year.249 When 
children of different races and ethnicities spend almost no time 
together, the long-term effect on American society can be quite 
balkanizing. The appearance and potential reality of balkanization 
are evident when segregated neighborhoods produce segregated 
 
 248. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“But we 
are not far distant from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-
sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools.”); Comfort v. 
Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, J., concurring) (“Some may be 
offended by any express use of race as a touchstone for transfers, believing that a race-based 
criterion is the wrong lesson for school boards to teach and students to absorb. But ours is a 
society with a heritage of racial problems growing out of generations of slavery and post-slavery 
segregation, and it may be unrealistic to suppose that everything will work out well if only race 
is ignored in every context.”). Justice Ginsburg added this useful reminder in Gratz: 
In the wake of a system of racial caste only recently ended, large disparities endure. 
Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary disproportionately by race. 
Neighborhoods and schools remain racially divided. African-American and Hispanic 
children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming 
institutions. Adult African-Americans and Hispanics generally earn less than whites 
with equivalent levels of education. Equally credentialed job applicants receive 
different receptions depending on their race. Irrational prejudice is still encountered 
in real estate markets and consumer transactions. Bias both conscious and 
unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up 
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and nondiscrimination are ever 
genuinely to become this country’s law and practice. 
539 U.S. at 299–301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes, citations, and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345–46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 249. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, School Colors, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 24, 2006, at 15 
(documenting that the percentage of black students attending schools with a majority nonwhite 
population has increased in every region of the country over the past fifteen years or so); 
CLOTFELTER, supra note 134, at 196 (“Racial segregation remains an ever-present fact, 
demarcating neighborhoods, urban jurisdictions, and thus many public schools. Middle schools 
and high schools that are desegregated often include classrooms and school activities that reveal 
obvious racial disparities.”). But see Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Federal Oversight, Local 
Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 1 
(Summer 2006) (examining the largest 100 school districts in the South and Border regions and 
finding that segregation measured as imbalance generally has not increased in the previous 
decade, excepting Charlotte and Winston Salem, North Carolina). 
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schools.250 Properly formulated, therefore, the concern about 
expressive harm counsels caution, not abandonment. 
Relatedly, a proponent of colorblindness might insist that the 
imposition of burdens based on race is inevitably balkanizing because 
those who must bear the burdens resent the fact that they would not 
have to endure them but for the color of their skin. Like the objection 
that stresses the expressive harm of using racial criteria, this is hardly 
an insubstantial concern, and it advises prudence and restraint. But 
this concern is shortsighted in its focus on some immediate 
resentment to the exclusion of long-term social benefits, and it proves 
too much because desegregation is all the more balkanizing in this 
way when courts impose race-conscious remedies for de jure 
segregation. Voluntary integration plans would not exist for any 
significant period of time if they did not enjoy broad community 
support, and reasonable concerns that government not increase 
balkanization can be addressed by constitutional and prudential 
attention to how the plans use race. Prohibiting any consideration of 
race as balkanizing would be overkill that itself would likely increase 
balkanization on balance because, to reiterate, the status quo is 
characterized by rampant racial segregation. 
This discussion suggests that the prospect of greater 
balkanization poses much less of a concern in the context of voluntary 
integration plans than in the context of affirmative action in higher 
education. By using racial criteria intelligently in the assignment 
process in order to integrate their schools, districts can reduce 
balkanization in American society. 
 
 250. See Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the result) (“The 
record shows, and common experience tells us, that students tend to select the schools closest to 
their homes, which means that schools will reflect the composition of the neighborhood where 
they are located. Neighborhoods, however, do not reflect the racial composition of the city as a 
whole. In Seattle, ‘as in many other cities, minorities and whites often live in different 
neighborhoods.’ Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). To the extent that students 
gravitate to the schools near their homes, the schools will have the same racial composition as 
the neighborhood. This means that student patterns of interacting primarily with members of 
their own race that are first developed by living in racially isolated neighborhoods will be 
continued and exacerbated by the school experience.”); see also Comfort, 418 F.3d at 29 
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“Lynn’s aim is to preserve local schools as an option without having 
the housing pattern of de facto segregation projected into the school system.”); Ryan, supra note 
5, at 327 (“Until residential integration increases dramatically, most public schools will remain 
racially isolated unless school boards adopt conscious measures to achieve integration. It is that 
simple.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Historical experience, including past judicial practice, 
substantiates this comparative analysis of racial balkanization. In the 
decades after Brown, the Court and individual Justices repeatedly 
declared, albeit in dicta, that the Constitution permits voluntary 
efforts to integrate local public schools well beyond what the 
Constitution requires. I refer not only to Brown itself,251 but also to 
decisions like Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,252 
North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann,253 Keyes v. School 
District No. 1,254 and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.255 The 
Court in these cases was validating the then-uncontroversial 
 
 251. 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools 
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the 
sanction of law.”) (emphasis added). See BICKEL, supra note 187, at 119–20 (discussing the 
implications of the Court’s choice of language). 
 252. 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (“School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to 
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order 
to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of 
Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an 
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school authorities . . . .”). Chief 
Justice Burger authored these words. 
 253. 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (“[A]s a matter of educational policy school authorities may well 
conclude that some kind of racial balance in the schools is desirable quite apart from any 
constitutional requirements.”). 
 254. 413 U.S. 189, 242 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“School 
boards would, of course, be free to develop and initiate further plans to promote school 
desegregation . . . . Nothing in this opinion is meant to discourage school boards from exceeding 
minimal constitutional standards in promoting the values of an integrated school experience.”). 
In Bustop, Inc. v. Board of Education, 439 U.S. 1380 (1978), Justice Rehnquist, acting as a 
Circuit Justice, rejected the argument of a stay applicant that “‘California in an attempt to 
racially balance schools [may not] use its doctrine of independent state grounds to ignore the 
federal rights of its citizens to be free from racial quotas and to be free from extensive pupil 
transportation that destroys fundamental rights of liberty and privacy,’” id. at 1382 (quoting stay 
application). Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning is directly on point: 
But this is not the traditional argument of a local school board contending that it has 
been required by court order to implement a pupil assignment plan which was not 
justified by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
argument is indeed novel . . . . While I have the gravest doubts that the Supreme 
Court of California was required by the United States Constitution to take the action 
that it has taken in this case, I have very little doubt that it was permitted by that 
Constitution to take such action. 
Id. at 1382–83. Coming from one of the most conservative jurists on the Court, this language 
should give pause to those who would obliterate the “play in the joints” between what the Equal 
Protection Clause requires and what it prohibits. See supra note 147 (discussing this point and 
analogizing to the Court’s religion jurisprudence). 
 255. 458 U.S. 457, 473 (1982) (“Attending an ethnically diverse school . . . prepar[es] 
minority children for citizenship in our pluralistic society, while, we may hope, teaching 
members of the racial majority to live in harmony and mutual respect with children of minority 
heritage.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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conclusions of many federal courts that the Constitution permits local 
efforts to integrate a community’s public schools when the 
Constitution does not require such action.256 The collective lesson of 
many school desegregation decisions is that voluntary integration 
plans do not raise grave constitutional concerns. 
Subsequent decisions limiting the remedies that federal courts 
may impose in school desegregation cases257 or requiring that federal 
desegregation remedies end258 are entirely consistent with this reading 
of the historical record. The Court in these cases gave voice to local 
resistance259 and limited the extent to which the federal courts could 
impose integration on communities. The Court stated that it was 
doing so in order to preserve “local control over the operation of 
schools.”260 When local communities themselves opted to integrate 
their public schools, the federal courts perceived no constitutional 
impediment. 
Significantly, when the composition of the federal judiciary and 
the ambient political climate changed in the 1970s and “courts began 
to reshape the presumption against racial classification into a 
constitutional constraint on voluntary efforts to combat 
segregation,”261 this reshaping was directed not at race-conscious 
student assignment plans, but at the significantly more divisive issue 
of affirmative action in higher education.262 Reva Siegel has 
convincingly shown that “the legal system was beginning to treat 
differently what was at stake in two potentially similar cases,” and 
 
 256. See Siegel, supra note 134, at 1511–12 (noting the “federalism question” informing “the 
view that would prevail throughout the 1960s: a state or local government might adopt race-
conscious districting plans to alleviate de facto segregation, when courts had not construed the 
Constitution to require them”); id. at 1517 (documenting that “[d]uring the 1960s, courts 
routinely upheld the right of state and local governments to act in a race-conscious fashion to 
ameliorate de facto segregation in public school assignments”); id. at 1518 (“[T]here was hardly 
a pressing sense that the Fourteenth Amendment was a constraint on voluntary efforts to 
desegregate.”). 
 257. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting interdistrict remedies in 
the absence of interdistrict violations and effects). 
 258. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); 
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). 
 259. See supra note 134. 
 260. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741–42. 
 261. Siegel, supra note 134, at 1521. 
 262. Id. at 1526 (“In the 1960s and early 1970s, courts had not imposed significant 
constitutional limits on race-conscious action undertaken to ameliorate segregation in public 
schools and in the construction industry, but they began to respond differently when plaintiffs 
challenged new race-conscious measures designed to help integrate the nation’s universities.”). 
02__SIEGEL.DOC 1/11/2007  10:44 AM 
2006] RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT 843 
that “[m]ajority-group objections to race-conscious professional 
school admissions policies played an important role in the policies’ 
emergent characterization as racial classifications subject to the 
presumption of unconstitutionality.”263 The historical record, 
therefore, confirms that voluntary integration plans have been less 
balkanizing than affirmative action in university admissions.264 
If it is correct as a matter of both analysis and history that race-
conscious assignment plans are less potentially balkanizing than 
affirmative action in higher education, it follows that the Court need 
not be as concerned with public perceptions in this context as it was in 
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz. This implication is significant because 
creating an appearance of minimal color consciousness poses special 
challenges in this setting for two reasons. First, the balkanizing 
potential of explicit racial criteria cannot be diminished by equating 
race to place of residence, student choice, sibling preference, etc., in 
the same way that race can be equated to various talents (e.g., 
intellectual, musical, or athletic) or other dimensions of general 
diversity (e.g., geography).265 Residence, student choice, and siblings 
have little to do with racial diversity, but various talents and 
geography arguably have something to do with general diversity. 
Second, in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz it was impossible to know 
for sure whether race was decisive in particular cases. With voluntary 
integration plans, by contrast, one can often know with certainty.266 In 
 
 263. Id. at 1528–29. See id. at 1529 n.204 (noting the public “perception that race-conscious 
desegregation initiatives in post-secondary education were constitutionally problematic in ways 
that such initiatives in elementary and secondary education were not”). 
 264. Cf., e.g., Brief for the Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 8–9, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 (U.S. 
Oct. 10, 2006) (“While the great majority of Louisvillians opposed desegregation in 1975, the 
vast majority of parents polled in 2000—77%—supported the use of race in student assignment, 
and 82% of parents believed that students benefited from a racially diverse school 
environment.”); McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 854 n.41 (W.D. 
Ky. 2004) (“In 2000, a confidential survey of high school juniors was conducted for JCPS to 
record the benefits of a racially integrated school system. Over 90% of the students who 
received the survey responded. Approximately 92% of White students and 96% of Black 
students reported that they were ‘very comfortable’ or ‘comfortable’ working with students 
from different racial and ethnic backgrounds. Over 80% of Black and White students who 
responded said their school experience helped them learn how to relate to students from other 
racial groups.”). 
 265. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that Justice Powell’s distinction 
between a quota and a “plus” factor enabled him to equate race with other characteristics that 
are less emotionally freighted). 
 266. See, e.g., Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 31 (1st Cir. 2005) (Selya, J., 
dissenting) (“In one sense, then, this plan is even more harmful than the racially inflexible 
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other words, it may not be easy to reconcile the publicly apparent use 
of race in student assignment in order to advance racial diversity with 
the appearance of not treating individuals in part as members of 
racial groups. In the Kentucky case, the district court put great weight 
on its determination that for the most part “the Board has 
undertaken considerable effort to achieve its goals without the overt 
use of race in student assignments,”267 and that “the racial guidelines 
play a muted role in the assignment process along with other 
factors.”268 But the court did not seem to register that such statements 
are in tension with its ability to determine that the JCPS denied 
“Plaintiff Crystal Meredith’s son, Joshua McDonald, . . . his transfer 
from Young to Bloom under the racial guidelines.”269 
The primary way that school districts can render the use of race 
less overt in the assignment process is in the drawing of attendance 
zones to increase integration. In Jefferson County, for example, the 
school district ensures compliance with the racial guidelines primarily 
by drawing attendance zones with race in mind.270 This is probably 
why Chief Judge Heyburn wrote that the district avoided “the overt 
use of race” and that “the racial guidelines play a muted role.”271 The 
school district may have concluded, similar to the implicit rationale of 
Justice Powell in Bakke and the Court in Grutter and Gratz, that 
implicit uses of race are less divisive—because less apparent and less 
seemingly “personal”—than granting or denying assignment or 
transfer requests explicitly based on the requesting student’s race. 
To reiterate, however, it is less important to submerge the use of 
race in this setting than in the context of affirmative action in higher 
education because the risk of increasing balkanization is significantly 
 
program struck down in Gratz. There, prospective non-minority students could be admitted by 
the terms of the policy itself and thus those who were rejected could look to something other 
than race as a reason for their failure.”), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). Toward the end of 
this section, I suggest a way to address this issue if it is deemed constitutionally problematic. 
 267. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (emphasis added). 
 268. Id. at 862 (emphasis added). The court contrasted sharply such use of race with the 
racial classifications deployed in the one part of the plan that it held unconstitutional: “The 
significance of separating traditional school applicants into explicit racial categories is that 
students are placed on separate assignment tracks where race becomes ‘the defining feature of 
his or her application.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 
(2003)). 
 269. Id. at 860 n.48. 
 270. See id. at 843 (“The geographic boundaries of resides areas and cluster schools 
determine most school assignments.”). 
 271. Id. at 861, 862 (emphasis added). 
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lower as a general matter. There are two principal ways that race-
conscious assignment plans could increase balkanization. First, they 
could subordinate all other traditional assignment factors to race in 
granting or denying student requests for assignment or transfer, 
thereby sending the balkanizing message that the racial divide in the 
community is so severe “that race matters most”272 in public 
education. Second, they could impose severe burdens on individual 
students and families because of the use of race, whether in disposing 
of individual requests or in drawing attendance zones. Individualized 
consideration must therefore attend to these concerns.273 
Accordingly, the Court should impose a modest individualized 
consideration requirement in the context of race-conscious 
assignment plans, one less demanding than the requirement 
articulated in Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz, but more demanding than 
the requirement employed in remedial or functional settings.274 Under 
this approach, school districts would not need to avoid making any 
assignments in which race was obviously decisive. The critical inquiry, 
rather, would be how much of an impact district-wide the use of racial 
classifications has in disposing of individual requests, and how much 
of a burden the use of racial criteria imposes on students and families. 
Stated more precisely, the individualized consideration 
requirement that I recommend would allow school districts to use 
race in assigning students to public schools so long as: (1) the school 
district’s use of racial criteria in making assignments constitutes only 
 
 272. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507 (2005). 
 273. One might object that the individualized consideration requirement and the undue 
burden analysis are separate components of narrow tailoring. In Grutter, however, the Court’s 
undue burden inquiry was parasitic on its application of the individualized consideration 
requirement. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. If concerns about the imposition of 
undue burdens are satisfied because a program affords individualized consideration, it must be 
because the individualized consideration inquiry appropriately incorporates an undue burden 
analysis as part of its requirements. A concern with racial balkanization animates each 
component of narrow tailoring. See supra notes 66, 128; infra note 294. 
 274. Some defenders of voluntary integration plans would prefer to argue that the concept 
of individualized consideration is inapplicable in assessing the plans. While this approach is 
tempting, it is based on a misunderstanding of the concept of individualized consideration. As 
developed in Part I, individualized consideration requires a determination of whether an 
individual satisfies the selection criteria that are deemed relevant to the government decision. 
School districts thus afford individualized consideration in deciding which students should 
attend which schools. The controversial normative question is what role, if any, race can play in 
student assignment. Contrary to the assumption of the opponents of these plans, the concept of 
individualized consideration cannot provide the answer. The question, in other words, is the 
extent to which race may be part of individualized consideration. 
02__SIEGEL.DOC 1/11/2007  10:44 AM 
846 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:781 
one of several factors; (2) the district’s use of racial classifications in 
granting or denying individual assignment or transfer requests, as a 
statistical matter, does not predominate over its use of other factors 
across the district as a whole;275 and (3) the use of racial criteria in 
disposing of individual requests and in drawing attendance zones (if 
applicable) does not impose substantial burdens on individual 
students and families.276 
The first factor provides one way of ensuring that school districts 
do not overuse racial criteria. No specific criteria should be required; 
that is for the districts themselves to decide. But if a district elects to 
consider race in pursuit of racial integration, then individualized 
consideration requires the district also to employ other relevant 
criteria. These include, for example, student preferences for certain 
schools, student residence, student interests, school capacity, presence 
of siblings in a school, where the student attended school the previous 
year, family hardship, ease of parental involvement, socioeconomic 
status, and lottery. 
Under the second factor, race may be decisive in individual cases 
in which the school district grants or denies student requests for 
particular schools, just as it is decisive in particular cases in Bakke- or 
Grutter-type admissions programs. But race may not be decisive too 
much of the time. As with most line-drawing problems in 
constitutional law, it may be impossible to specify in advance how 
much is too much. The answer in particular cases would depend on 
how segregated the school district is, and on how necessary it is to use 
racial classifications to a particular extent in order to achieve a 
significant measure of integration.277 Race should not be dispositive 
 
 275. Although in redistricting a finding of predominance triggers strict scrutiny, here strict 
scrutiny would be triggered by government’s use of a racial classification. A finding of 
predominance in this setting would be dispositive of the constitutional inquiry. Here, moreover, 
the defendant school board would have the burden of proving non-predominance in order to 
survive the narrow tailoring inquiry. 
 276. Each factor is derived from the Court’s past decisions discussed in Part II. They reflect 
the view (to which no court has ascribed) that the redistricting cases are relevant. But they also 
reflect the view that the redistricting cases are not exactly on point. As discussed in the text, 
race-conscious redistricting separates voters based on race. Moreover, the burdens are 
potentially higher in the assignment context because there is no redistricting analogue to a long 
bus commute or an inferior education. 
 277. A potential paradox lurks here because the perceived need for integration is likely 
correlated with the individual burdens imposed by a race-conscious plan. The more segregated a 
school district is, the greater will be the felt need for governmental action to achieve integration, 
but the greater may also be the burdens imposed by a plan—for example, bus commutes may be 
longer. The individualized consideration requirement may thus limit the use of race to the 
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regarding “a significant number”278 of assignment or transfer requests, 
and this surely means far fewer than half of them.  
In narrowing the permissible range further, the relevant tradeoff 
entails allowing districts to secure and to affirm meaningful levels of 
racial integration while avoiding the expressive harms and significant 
burdens that racial classifications can impose. The Court should 
probably draw a rough line in order to provide guidance to school 
boards. As a general matter, no constitutional problem would seem to 
be presented when race proved decisive in granting or denying up to 
fifteen or twenty percent of individual assignments or transfer 
requests. When race was decisive more than roughly one-fifth of the 
time, the plan should probably be regarded as suspect. 
While it is difficult to avoid claims of arbitrariness in proposing a 
rough limit of fifteen or twenty percent (or any other limit), the only 
reasonable way to resolve a line-drawing problem is to draw a 
reasonable line. The Court has sought to do just that on several 
occasions.279 A constraint of fifteen or twenty percent would likely 
allow many school districts to achieve significant levels of integration 
in the face of segregated housing patterns while avoiding the symbolic 
and material harms of robust race consciousness. As discussed in the 
next section, for example, both plans before the Court have stayed 
within a fifteen percent upper bound in disposing of student requests, 
and both have achieved meaningful levels of integration. 
The details of specific plans would also matter in light of the 
third factor, which focuses on the burdens imposed on students and 
families when government uses racial criteria in the assignment 
process, whether in disposing of individual requests or in drawing 
attendance zones (if the plan so requires). Whether a given plan met 
this component of the individualized consideration requirement 
would be determined by an evaluation of several factors. These 
include quality differences among the schools in the district;280 the 
 
greatest extent when residential segregation is most severe. A way to ameliorate this problem 
would be to allow the scope of the permissible use of race to vary somewhat with the scope of 
the segregation at which the use of race is directed. 
 278. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 279. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (ratio limits 
on punitive damages); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (time limit on detaining 
aliens pending removal); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56–58 (1991) (time 
limit on delay between arrest and probable cause hearing). 
 280. The burdens can be particularly high when a school district allocates scarce slots in a 
highly sought-after magnet school, whether operated by lottery or otherwise. 
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amount of student time spent on a school bus each day as a result of 
the use of race; the impact of using race on parental convenience and 
involvement; and the availability of hardship exceptions or appeals. 
For example, the Swann Court’s holding regarding the use of bus 
transportation as a “tool of desegregation” is apt here: bus 
transportation is constitutionally permissible unless “the time or 
distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children 
or significantly impinge on the educational process.”281 The 
constitutional concern is not whether a plan as a whole imposes 
burdens greater than the benefits it provides; rather, the burden 
factors are probative of whether the plan is sufficiently sensitive to 
the circumstances of each student and family. In other words, an 
assessment of individual burdens must be part of the selection criteria 
when government makes race a relevant criterion in student 
assignment. 
If my proposal were deemed to impose insufficient limits on the 
use of explicit racial criteria in student assignment, whether in 
appearance or reality, an alternative would be to soften the use of 
racial classifications by making race more of a Bakke- or Grutter-type 
“plus” factor. Under this individualized consideration requirement, 
the granting of an assignment or transfer request would never turn 
explicitly and exclusively on race, but would depend instead on an 
implicit and opaque evaluation of several factors, such as commute 
distance, family hardship, and the relation between program offerings 
and student interests. Race could still be a factor, but it would never 
be obviously decisive when the district denied a student request. 
Because of the differences between voluntary integration plans and 
affirmative action in higher education in terms of their relative 
potential for balkanization, I do not endorse this kind of 
individualized consideration requirement. But such a requirement 
would be more responsive to the conflicting constitutional values at 
stake than a requirement that prohibited any explicit use of race as an 
assignment criterion. 
While the burden inquiry I propose extends to the use of race 
both in granting or denying individual requests and in drawing 
attendance zones, I have limited the predominance inquiry to the 
former aspect of voluntary integration plans. Unlike race-conscious 
redistricting, therefore, I have not recommended a requirement of 
 
 281. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1971). 
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nonpredominance in drawing attendance zones. This is because the 
redistricting cases are inapt in a significant respect: while race-
conscious redistricting separates racial groups in order to give 
members of one group a more effective vote,282 race-conscious 
attendance zones of the sort before the Court in the Jefferson County 
case integrate racial groups in order to benefit students of every race 
and ethnicity.283 The expressive message and the potential for 
balkanization, therefore, are quite different. As long as school boards 
do not impose significant burdens on individuals and families by using 
race in drawing attendance zones—for example, by drawing zones 
with non-contiguous boundaries that require long bus commutes—the 
zoning should survive judicial scrutiny. Under my approach, 
therefore, courts would not have to comb the legislative record and 
the enactment history for evidence of the predominant use of race in 
drawing attendance zones. 
Because I would impose a predominance inquiry at the micro-
level of individual requests but not at the macro-level of attendance 
zones, the necessary implication is that a given degree of race 
consciousness should be regarded as more suspect when deployed at 
the micro-level than when used at the macro-level. It may seem 
perplexing why this should be so. The answer lies in the concern 
animating Justice Powell’s distinction between using racial quotas and 
using race as a “plus” factor, and the Rehnquist Court’s distinction 
between a publicly declared award of twenty points and a publicly 
undefined “plus” factor.284 Judging from the Court’s previous 
interventions, the felt impact of race-consciousness on those who are 
burdened by it is less acute when it is less publicly apparent. In other 
words, the individualized consideration requirement that I endorse 
would apply the lesson of Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz to a different 
setting: racial criteria are less likely to be balkanizing when 
government does not needlessly impress on people that they (or their 
children) are being treated in part as members of racial groups. In the 
assignment context, moreover, the use of race is more general and 
 
 282. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2663 (2006) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) 
(“It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”); supra note 97 and accompanying text 
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
 283. If school districts drew attendance zones that separated the races in order to give 
minorities more control over the public schools that their children attended, the analogy to 
redistricting would be stronger. See supra note 198 (referencing a recent Nebraska law). 
 284. See supra Parts II.A–B (discussing Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz). 
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diffuse—that is, less seemingly “personal”—in drawing attendance 
zones than in disposing of individual requests for certain schools. 
Accordingly, a given degree of race-consciousness is less 
constitutionally problematic in drawing attendance zones for large 
numbers of students than in granting or rejecting individual 
assignment or transfer requests. Even if in certain situations the two 
uses of race would achieve the same “net operative results,”285 the 
perception and thus the potential for balkanization can be quite 
different. Race must not predominate in disposing of individual 
requests, but no such requirement should limit the drawing of 
attendance zones. Rather, a burden analysis should constrain the use 
of racial criteria in drawing attendance zones.286  
In evaluating colorblindness discourse in this setting, it is 
important to bear in mind that a genuine commitment to 
colorblindness would prohibit any race consciousness even in drawing 
attendance zones, siting schools to increase integration, establishing 
magnet schools to prevent white flight, etc. Districts could be hard-
pressed to achieve even modest levels of integration.287 The Justices 
presumably know this and care. If the Court invalidates the Jefferson 
County and Seattle plans, therefore, it is more likely to prohibit 
explicit racial classifications that impose obvious individual burdens 
(e.g., a race-based denial of an assignment request) than it is to 
prohibit implicit race consciousness that imposes non-obvious 
individual burdens (e.g., race-conscious attendance zones)—even 
when the former use of race is more limited than the latter. Justices 
Powell and O’Connor are gone, but appearances may matter to 
several current Justices. 
Although my analysis accepts (as it must) the constitutional 
relevance of social appearances, I do not advise prohibiting any use of 
racial classifications in student assignment. First, the Court has 
allowed them in the more divisive area of affirmative action in higher 
education. It would therefore make scant sense to impose a flat 
prohibition here. Second, banning even the modest use of racial 
classifications in student assignment would ignore the significant 
benefits that they can produce, both in achieving greater levels of 
 
 285. See supra notes 37–38 (quoting Mishkin’s analysis of Bakke). 
 286. For a contrary view of the appropriate scope of the predominance inquiry in the 
context of voluntary integration plans, see generally Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript on file with the author). 
 287. See supra note 233. 
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integration and in expressively affirming the value of integration.288 
As Part II demonstrated, the Court’s opinions display sensitivity not 
just to the costs, but also to the benefits of using racial classifications 
to a limited extent. 
Finally, a complete ban on using racial classifications might make 
everyone within a school district worse off by forcing school boards to 
decide between pursuing integration and enhancing student choice. 
Districts that focused on integration would leave all students with 
fewer options. For example, high school students in Seattle enjoy 
more choices than do students in Jefferson County, and the Seattle 
plan uses race more explicitly than does the JCPS plan, precisely 
because the Seattle School District does not use the attendance zones 
that the JCPS employs. The JCPS, moreover, is able to allow some 
measure of student choice because it too makes limited use of racial 
classifications. Without using racial classifications to some extent in 
order to prevent student choices from unraveling the integration 
produced by the attendance zones, the JCPS might have to either 
strictly limit student choices or abandon integration as a goal. The 
Constitution should not impose on communities an acute trade-off 
between racial integration and student choice. 
2. Applying the Standard.  With these considerations in mind, I 
turn now to the plans before the Court.289 Although the district court 
in the case involving Jefferson County, Kentucky, fixated 
inappropriately on the requirement of individualized consideration 
articulated in Grutter and Gratz, the court nonetheless tracked much 
of my recommended approach. It stated that “the Court must 
determine whether the 2001 Plan incorporates some sufficient form of 
individualized attention in the assignment process,” and “conclude[d] 
that it does.”290 This was because “the JCPS assignment process 
focuses a great deal of attention on the individual characteristics of a 
student’s application, such as place of residence and student choice of 
school or program. It is individualized consideration of a different 
 
 288. See supra note 224. 
 289. Because I have not comprehensively reviewed the lower court records, the following 
evaluations should be deemed incomplete. If the Court were to adopt an approach similar to 
mine, a remand would probably be warranted in order to enable the lower courts to apply the 
standard in the first instance. 
 290. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 858 (W.D. Ky. 2004), 
aff’d, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of 
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). 
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kind in a different context than the Supreme Court found in 
Grutter.”291 The court then identified similarities to Grutter: 
In significant ways, the 2001 Plan actually operates like the “plus” 
system of which the Supreme Court has spoken so approvingly. 
Many factors determine student assignment, including address, 
student choice, lottery placement, and, at the margins, the racial 
guidelines. But, race is simply one possible factor among many, 
acting only occasionally as a permissible “tipping” factor in most of 
the JCPS assignment process.292 
Putting aside the propriety of the court’s distinguishing and then 
analogizing almost exclusively to Grutter, the important point is that 
the school district’s use of racial classifications in granting or denying 
assignment or transfer requests is modest in scope, as are the race-
based burdens imposed by the assignment process as a whole. Race 
affects the district’s disposition of some student requests, but not 
many, and other factors such as student preferences and school 
capacity weigh more heavily in the process. The court specifically 
pointed to “[d]ata showing that the majority of students attend their 
resides schools and that only a very small percentage of students are 
not assigned to one of the schools they preferred,” which “suggest[ed] 
the minimal impact of race on this process.”293 
In addition, the court found that all JCPS schools are “equal and 
integrated” and “have similar funding, offer similar academic 
programs and comprise more similar ranges of students than possible 
in neighborhood schools.”294 As far as I can tell, moreover, the use of 
race does not require onerous bus commutes. These considerations 
more than suffice to satisfy the individualized consideration 
requirement appropriate in this setting.295 
 
 291. Id. at 859. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 861–62. Earlier in its opinion, the court specifically noted that “[g]enerally, about 
95–96% of all elementary students receive their first or second choice cluster school,” id. at 845 
n.18, and that “most” middle school and high school students “choose to attend their resides 
school, for which the only selection criteria are [elementary or] middle school graduation and 
place of residence,” id. at 845. 
 294. Id. at 860, 862. The court recorded these observations as part of its “undue harm” 
analysis, but the different dimensions of the narrow tailoring inquiry can bleed together in light 
of the concern with racial balkanization that unites them. See supra note 273 (discussing the 
Grutter Court’s treatment of the narrow tailoring inquiry); supra notes 66, 128. 
 295. The United States misunderstands the concept of individualized consideration and 
misapplies Grutter when it chides the JCPS for not “minimizing the use of race in its assignment 
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To be sure, the district uses race much more in drawing 
attendance zones than in disposing of individual assignment or 
transfer requests. Some of these zones have non-contiguous 
boundaries that are designed to increase integration.296 In this regard, 
the district court’s reference to “the minimal impact of race on this 
process”297 was not accurate. But for the reasons already discussed, 
race consciousness in drawing attendance zones is constitutionally 
unproblematic in the absence of significant burdens on students and 
families. 
The Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion than the 
McFarland district court regarding the applicability of individualized 
consideration in this setting. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “if a 
noncompetitive, voluntary student assignment plan is otherwise 
narrowly tailored, a district need not consider each student in an 
individualized, holistic manner.”298 It so held because “the dangers 
that are present in the university context—of substituting racial 
preference for qualification-based competition—are absent here.”299 
The court of appeals made an important point. As discussed, 
however, higher education is not the only context in which the Court 
has imposed an individualized consideration requirement, and the 
relevance of individual merit is not the only determinant of whether 
the Justices have demanded some form of individualized 
consideration. I therefore assess the compatibility of the Seattle plan 
with the form of individualized consideration that is most appropriate 
in light of the Court’s decisions. 
 
plan and maximizing the concept of individualized consideration.” Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 17, at 16–17. For the reasons stated in Part I, 
there is nothing about the use of racial criteria that is incompatible with the concept of 
individualized consideration. And for the reasons discussed in Part II, the federal government’s 
rendition has little to do with the use of race approved by Justice Powell in Bakke and by the 
Court in Grutter. 
 296. Brief for Respondents at 8, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-915 
(U.S. Oct. 10, 2006) (“Racial integration in resides middle schools and high schools . . . is 
accomplished primarily through the drawing of attendance areas, some of which have non-
contiguous boundaries. In elementary schools, it is accomplished by the cluster plan . . . .”). 
 297. McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 861–62. 
 298. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908). 
 299. Id. at 1181. 
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The Seattle plan is on par with the JCPS plan in some ways, but 
it is more suspect in other ways.300 Like the JCPS, the district uses race 
with care and the resulting impact on the disposition of individual 
assignment requests is modest. Specifically, before the plan was 
modified to decrease the impact of race,301 around 300 (or 10 percent) 
of the roughly 3,000 incoming high school students were assigned to 
an oversubscribed high school because of the race-based tiebreaker.302  
 
 300. Neither plan makes distinctions among minority groups, but this fact is potentially 
more problematic from the standpoint of narrow tailoring in the case of the Seattle plan. While 
Seattle is a racially and ethnically diverse community, id. at 1166, the JCPS is populated almost 
entirely by black and white students, McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 840 n.6. Judge Bea decried 
that the Seattle School District “does not even consider the student’s actual race.” Parents 
Involved, 426 F.3d at 1210 (Bea, J., dissenting). The Ninth Circuit determined that “the 
District’s choice to increase diversity along the white/nonwhite axis is rooted in Seattle’s history 
and current reality of de facto segregation resulting from Seattle’s segregated housing patterns,” 
and that “[t]his white/nonwhite focus is also consistent with the history of public school 
desegregation measures throughout the country.” Id. at 1187. Although Judge Bea’s concern is 
hardly trivial in light of the expressive dimension of racial classifications, the fact remains that 
white/nonwhite segregation is the most significant dimension of racial segregation in Seattle. 
Moreover, attending to levels of diversity among minority groups would require greater use of 
race than Seattle attempted and would therefore impose more substantial burdens. It would be 
counterproductive for narrow tailoring to require this. Accord Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 
418 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005). 
More troubling in some respects are arguments that the district has done little to 
ameliorate racial isolation in its most segregated schools. See Petitioner’s Brief at 37, Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 05-908 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006) (criticizing 
the District’s use of race for its “underinclusiveness”). It is unclear why the district purports to 
be concerned with reducing racial isolation and yet has done nothing to address such isolation in 
its most segregated, less popular high schools. See id. at 37 (reporting that Rainier Beach High 
School is 8 percent white and Cleveland High School is 10 percent white). From the standpoint 
of ensuring a proper fit between means and ends, these facts raise questions about the 
genuineness of the district’s stated interest in reducing isolation. But from the perspective of 
reducing balkanization potentially caused by racial classifications, the district’s approach is 
defensible. If the alleged constitutional problem is any use of race, the less suspect course 
cannot be more use of race. See id. at 19 (“At a minimum, the District could have . . . narrow[ed] 
the use of race by broadening to 20 percent the band of permissible deviation from ‘balance.’”). 
Moreover, it cannot be the case that the Constitution prohibits the district from addressing any 
problems of racial isolation unless it addresses all or even most problems of racial isolation.  
 301. The Ninth Circuit explained that initially “schools that deviated by more than 10 
percent” from the racial make up of Seattle public schools as a whole “were deemed racially 
imbalanced. For the 2001–2002 school year, however, the triggering number was increased to 15 
percent, softening the effect of the tiebreaker.” Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1170 (footnote 
omitted). Moreover, “the District also developed a ‘thermostat,’ whereby the tiebreaker is 
applied to the entering ninth grade student population only until it comes within the 15 percent 
plus or minus variance.” Id. Finally, “[t]he tiebreaker does not apply, and race is not considered, 
for students entering a high school after the ninth grade (e.g., by transfer).” Id. 
 302. Id. 
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On the other hand, although the Ninth Circuit noted that “the 
District implemented the Plan as part of a comprehensive effort to 
improve and equalize the attractiveness of all the high schools,” it 
also observed that “the high schools vary widely in desirability.”303 
The burdens imposed on individual students by the use of racial 
criteria are significant when race determines placement in a school 
that offers a far inferior education.304 It may also be troubling that, as 
Judge Bea stressed, the operation of the race-based tiebreaker 
confronted the children of two plaintiffs with the prospect of “a daily 
multi-bus round-trip commute of over four hours.”305 
Yet the en banc majority observed that all students could choose 
to attend a school close to where they live: “Because there are 
multiple schools in the north and south of Seattle, students for whom 
proximity is a priority may elect as their first choice one of the schools 
in their residential area that is not oversubscribed and be guaranteed 
an assignment to that school.”306 From the standpoint of individual 
burdens, however, the plan remains problematic to the extent that 
students can access quality schools only if they endure long 
commutes.307 
 
 303. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1169. The court of appeals continued: 
Three of the northern schools—Ballard, Nathan Hale and Roosevelt—and two of the 
southern schools—Garfield and Franklin—are highly desirable and oversubscribed, 
meaning that more students wish to attend those schools than capacity allows. The 
magnitude of the oversubscription is noteworthy: For the academic year 2000–01, 
approximately 82 percent of students selected one of the oversubscribed schools as 
their first choice, while only about 18 percent picked one of the undersubscribed high 
schools as their first choice. Only when oversubscription occurs does the District 
become involved in the assignment process. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 300, at 4 (documenting quality 
differences among the high schools of the Seattle School District). 
 304. Cf. Comfort, 418 F.3d at 20 (“Every child in Lynn is guaranteed a seat in a district 
where, as the parties have stipulated, every school provides a comparable education.”). 
 305. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1216 (Bea, J., dissenting). Judge Bea reported that “[t]he 
parents instead enrolled their children in private schools.” Id.; see also Petitioner’s Brief, supra 
note 300, at 7–9 (discussing the cases of these two families). The fact that both Judge Bea and 
the petitioners elected to focus on the same two families may suggest that their stories are 
extraordinary. This is an important question, and the answer is presumably ascertainable. 
 306. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1181 n.21. 
 307. See Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Parents Involved in 
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (No. 05-908) (“Due to the 
extraordinarily high demand for assignment to Ballard High School . . . , there was considerable 
unhappiness about the effect of the integration tiebreaker in the adjacent (predominantly 
white) . . . areas of Seattle. . . . It was uncontested, however, that families from these 
neighborhoods could have elected to send their children to Franklin High School, which PICS 
admits and the record demonstrates is a ‘very impressive’ school, or they could have sought 
assignment to Garfield High School, regarded by many as Seattle’s most prestigious high school, 
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In other respects, Judge Bea’s treatment of the individualized 
consideration inquiry is misguided: 
Here, the racial tiebreaker works to admit or exclude high school 
students from certain oversubscribed schools solely on the basis of 
their skin color. No other consideration affects the operation of the 
racial tiebreaker; when it operates, it operates to admit or exclude 
either a white or nonwhite student, depending upon how the 
admission will affect the preferred balance at the oversubscribed 
school. Such a program is precisely what Grutter warned against, and 
what Gratz held unconstitutional: a mechanical, predetermined 
policy “of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[] single 
‘soft’ variable,” that being the student’s skin color.308 
Judge Bea not only ignored the differences between the university 
context and the public school setting, but he also focused on the 
operation of the racial tiebreaker in isolation from the rest of the 
plan.309 The sibling tiebreaker accounts for 15 to 20 percent of 
assignments to the ninth grade class, and the distance of a chosen 
school from a student’s home accounts for 70 to 75 percent of 
assignments to the ninth grade.310 The racial tiebreaker is thus one 
modest factor in the assignment process. To be sure, it is decisive in 
some individual cases, but the same was of course true of the 
admissions process at issue in Grutter and the type of program that 
Justice Powell approved in Bakke. Potential decisiveness is 
necessarily entailed whenever race operates as one factor. 
Judge Bea also concluded that voluntary integration plans must 
consider individual talents and other contributions to general 
diversity: 
 
which was integration neutral at the time.” (citations omitted)). Although the two students 
discussed in the text live north of downtown, Franklin and Garfield are located south of 
downtown. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 300, at 4–5. 
 308. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1210 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
 309. The United States offers the same misguided analysis. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 17, at 19 (“Far from ensuring individualized 
consideration ‘through the entire process,’ the District’s racial tiebreaker simply labels 
applicants based on race alone, and makes assignment decisions to oversubscribed schools 
based solely on those labels. Students are thus automatically accepted or rejected based on their 
race.” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003))). By the time race comes into 
play, student choices, school capacity, and sibling preferences have already influenced the 
process. If race does not come into play, geography and lotteries determine the rest of the 
assignments. Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1169–71. 
 310. Id. at 1169, 1171. 
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The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires the 
District to focus upon the individual’s whole make up, rather than 
just a group’s skin color; this protects each student’s right to equal 
protection under the law. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 . . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . [T]hirteen- or fourteen-year-old students are not so young 
that they have not yet developed unique traits to set themselves 
apart from other students and add greater diversity to the student 
body. The student’s race is a factor in assessing the student as an 
individual, but the student may also speak English as a second 
language, come from a different socioeconomic stratum than other 
students, have overcome adversity, be a talented baseball player, 
musician, or have participated in community service.311 
Judge Bea failed to register that the Grutter-type individualized 
consideration requirement that he would impose has nothing to do 
with the district’s compelling interest in racial integration (as opposed 
to general diversity), whose existence he assumes “[f]or argument’s 
sake” in this portion of his dissent.312 The Constitution cannot require 
a school district to replace a nonevaluative student assignment plan 
that seeks racial integration with an admissions process that pursues 
general diversity before school officials lawfully may use race. The 
point of narrow tailoring is not to alter fundamentally the nature of 
the compelling interest that government seeks to advance. Thus, 
Judge Bea’s purported analysis of individualized consideration 
actually constitutes little more than a reiteration of his conclusion that 
racial integration does not advance a compelling interest.313 
Because of the greater disparity in the perceived quality of the 
various schools in the district and the possibility that students may 
face a choice between short commutes and quality schools, the Seattle 
plan presents a closer case than does the JCPS plan. The Seattle 
plan’s use of race would be less suspect if the district were to reduce 
the quality differences among its high schools.314 A system of equal 
schools should not be required before government may use race in 
 
 311. Id. at 1212 (Bea, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 
 312. Id. at 1209. 
 313. Given that Grutter was decided in 2003, it is remarkable that Judge Bea describes the 
decision as one of “two exceptions still standing” to “a landscape littered with rejected asserted 
‘compelling interests’ requiring race-based determinations.” Id. at 1201. 
 314. I recognize that this is much easier said than done and that more funding is hardly 
sufficient. 
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order to advance integration, because one of the very reasons that 
school districts pursue integration is to make their schools less 
unequal.315 But this reality does not change the Court’s likely 
judgment that requiring a student to attend a far inferior school (or to 
endure a long commute in order to access a quality school) in part 
because of the use of race imposes a substantial burden on the 
individual. Regardless of whether one agrees with this view of the 
matter, the Court’s decisions reflect sensitivity to such burdens.316 
In any event, it does not appear that students in Seattle typically 
must attend far inferior schools because of the District’s use of race. 
Nor does it appear that they typically must endure long bus 
commutes because of the use of race. If either occurred in particular 
instances, or if certain students confronted acute tradeoffs between 
commutes and quality, then an as-applied constitutional challenge 
might lie. But for the reasons discussed, the Seattle plan on its face 
likely meets the individualized consideration requirement appropriate 
in this setting. 
CONCLUSION 
I began by defining the concept of individualized consideration 
apart from any legal requirements. I then turned to these 
requirements by engaging the Court’s equal protection decisions on 
their own terms. I demonstrated that the primary concern animating 
the Court’s imposition of a particular kind of individualized 
consideration requirement in a given setting is its assessment of the 
probable net effect of using racial criteria on balkanization in 
America. The relationship I identified among anticipated 
balkanization, individualized consideration, and the use of race as a 
selection criterion should prove useful in analyzing instances of race-
conscious decision making that have arisen in the past and that 
undoubtedly will arise in the future. 
 
 315. See supra notes 202–08 and accompanying text (documenting the sensitivity of teacher 
quality to the racial composition of a public school independent of other variables that affect 
teacher quality, including school poverty). 
 316. The Court aside, defenders of voluntary integration plans should be concerned about 
the individual burdens that such plans impose based on race. Even if one disagrees that the 
burdensome use of racial criteria raises equality and fairness concerns in this context, such use 
imperils the long-term viability of the plans. They cannot survive if large segments of a district’s 
population find them unacceptable and the community is fueled by resentment. Cf. supra notes 
96, 134 (stressing the importance of social acceptance in the context of court-ordered 
desegregation plans). 
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Focusing on the present, I next examined how the Court’s 
concern about balkanization plays out in the context of race-
conscious student assignment plans. I suggested that the stakes are 
high for America because the central disagreement concerns which 
elements of national identity should prevail in an instance of genuine 
value conflict. Defenders of the plans conceive integration as the 
enduring moral legacy of Brown, and they view living together across 
racial and ethnic lines as critical if America is ever going to be the 
kind of nation that it aspires to be. Many critics of the plans view 
colorblindness—or, at a minimum, a repudiation of racial 
classifications—as both the true legacy of Brown and the embodiment 
of the sort of community that the nation should aspire to be 
regardless of who associates with whom. Each side embraces 
hallowed national ideals, and each of these ideals was “purchased at 
the price of immeasurable human suffering.”317 
After explaining why voluntary integration plans advance several 
compelling interests, I recommended an individualized consideration 
requirement that accords with the constitutional concerns underlying 
past decisions. This form of individualized consideration is modest in 
its demands because race-conscious assignment plans likely reduce 
racial balkanization when they do not subordinate other 
considerations to race in granting or denying student requests for 
particular schools and do not impose substantial burdens. Under this 
variant of individualized consideration, school districts may use racial 
criteria in making assignments so long as race constitutes only one of 
several factors, race does not predominate district-wide in disposing 
of assignment or transfer requests, and the use of race does not 
impose substantial burdens on individual students and families. 
I have not purported to resolve this instance of acute value 
conflict as an original matter. Rather, the standard I have proposed 
reflects the constitutional concerns of the Rehnquist Court. It 
believed simultaneously that America is a society “in which race 
unfortunately still matters”318 and that we should “encourage the 
transition to a society where race no longer matters.”319 If the Roberts 
Court values fidelity to the Court’s past encounters with race-
conscious state action, then the analysis I commend, or something like 
 
 317. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 318. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). 
 319. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
02__SIEGEL.DOC 1/11/2007  10:44 AM 
860 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:781 
it, should guide its resolution of these potentially historic cases. If the 
Roberts Court elects instead to forge a new path, then the foregoing 
analysis will have provided a framework for assessing the magnitude 
of the departure. 
